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ABSTRACT 
 
TIKA: DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCES AS A CASE OF IMPLEMENTING 
SOFT POWER IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
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MA THESIS, December 2016 
Thesis Advisor: Prof. Bülent Aras 
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The 21
st
 century marks an era of major changes in the Turkish foreign policy with the 
introduction of two new terms to the political literature: soft power and development 
assistance. Both terms gained popularity in the world politics after the Cold War, as states 
started to incorporate soft power and development assistance actively to the practices in 
relation to their foreign policies. 
Following the end of the Cold War, the world politics was gradually shaped around the 
term development assistance. For states, being a development assistance provider became a 
major issue in the international arena. Although it was not until 1960s that states 
systematically adopted the idea of being donor countries for development assistance, such 
assistance became quite popular after the Cold War Era. During that period, various 
development agencies were founded or some already existent institutions were transformed 
into providers of development assistance. In that, development assistance was generally 
benefited by states in implementing their soft power within the scope of their foreign 
policies. Looking to a specific case in this respect, TIKA – the Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency – has gradually become the main provider of development assistance 
to various countries as a part of the Turkish foreign policy. 
This dissertation is focused on comprehending the role of TIKA in changing the Turkish 
foreign policy on the basis of the concept of soft power. Such an analysis is made possible 
through scrutinizing current geopolitical theories and understanding the possible connection 
of such theories to realist and constructivist theories. As a matter of fact, the frame of the 
dissertation is essentially formed on the basis of an in-depth analysis of basic theories on 
geopolitics and their implications in realist and constructivist theories of international 
relations. The focal point will dwell on the soft power in the Turkish foreign policy that has 
been grabbing attention since 2000s. Furthermore, development assistance provided so far 
by TIKA for various countries will be under scrutiny as a case study in relation to the 
implementation of soft power. 
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ÖZET 
 
TİKA: TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA YUMUŞAK GÜÇ UYGULAMASININ 
ÖRNEK OLAYI OLARAK KALKINMA YARDIMLARI 
HAKAN SEZGİN ERKAN 
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, Aralık 2016 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Bülent Aras 
Anahtar Kelimler: Kalkınma Yardımları, Yumuşak Güç, Jeopolitik, TİKA 
21. yüzyıl Türk Dış Politikasında değişim yılları olmuş ve yumuşak güç kavamı ile 
kalkınma yardımları kavramları Türk Dış Politikası için önem listesinin üst sıralarında yer 
almıştır. İki kavramda Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde dünya siyasteinde önem kazanmış ve 
devletler bu kavramların dış politikaları bünyesinde kullanmaya başlamışlardır. 
Kalkınma yardımları ve kalkınma yardımları sağlayan olma Soğuk Savaş Sonrası dönemin 
önemli iki konusundandırlar. Kalkınma yardımları ve yardım sağlayıcı ülke olma 
1960’larda başlamış olsa da önem kazanmas Soğuk Savaş sonrası sürece denk gelmiştir. 
Kalkınma Yardım Ajansları, devletlerin dış politikalarının yumuşak güç uygulamalarının 
bir aracı olarak ortaya çıkmış veya değişime uğramışlardır. Bu çerçevede, TIKA, Türk Dış 
Politikasında artan eğilime uygun olarak, Türk kalkınma yardımlarının temel sağlayıcısı 
olmuştur. 
Bu tezin amacı, jeopolitik teorileri inceleyerek bu teoriler ile realizm ve konstrüktivizm 
arasındaki bağı ele alarak TIKA’nın değişen Türk Dış Politikası’ndaki yerini yumuşak güç 
kavramı üzerinden araçsallaştırmaktır. Bu sebeple, tezde, temel jeopolitik teorileri 
inceleyerek, bu teoriler ile realizm ve konstrüktivizmin arasındaki ilişki analiz edilecektir. 
Temel odak noktası ise 2000’li yıllarda Türk Dış Politikasında artarak göze çarpan 
yumuşak güç kavramı olacak ve TİKA’nın kalkınma yardınlarının yumuşak gücün 
uygulanması örneği olarak incelenecektir. 
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my brother, Gökhan Erkan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I am primarily grateful to my supervisor Mr. Bülent Aras for his extensive contributions in 
my dissertation, which would not have come forward, if Bülent Aras did not encourage me 
to initiate a research on the TIKA and relevant development aids as the main theme. 
Secondly, I would like to extend my sincerest thanks and appreciation to MS. Selin Türkeş-
Kılıç for her support and encouragement. 
Thirdly, I would like to thank Ms. Bilgen Sütçüoğlu for the support and encouragement she 
provided ever since I started my undergraduate education. 
I would be proud to dedicate this dissertation to all people with Down syndrome. My 
brother, Gökhan Erkan is also one of them and the most special person in my life. 
My sincere thanks go to the anonymous person who made it possible for me to complete 
my Master’s degree in the Department of Turkish Studies at Sabancı University. 
I finally would like to thank the faculty members in the Department of Political Science and 
International Relations at Yeditepe University.  
 
 
 
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... iv 
ÖZET ...................................................................................................................................... v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................. vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER 1 ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2 ........................................................................................................................... 5 
2 DEFINITION OF GEOPOLITICS AND ITS ORIGINS ................................................ 5 
CHAPTER 3 ........................................................................................................................... 7 
3 THEORIES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GEOPOLITICS .................. 7 
3.1 Classical Realism and Geopolitical Theories ........................................................... 8 
3.1.1 Precursors of realist theory and their implications ........................................... 9 
3.1.2 Deliberations on realism ................................................................................. 12 
3.1.2.1 The state ...................................................................................................... 12 
3.1.2.2 The international system ............................................................................. 12 
3.1.2.3 Power........................................................................................................... 13 
3.1.3 Classical Realism and Classical Geopolitics .................................................. 15 
3.1.4 Geopolitical Theories ...................................................................................... 17 
3.1.5 Classical Geopolitics ....................................................................................... 17 
3.1.5.1 The organic state perspective ...................................................................... 19 
3.1.5.2 Geo-Strategic perspective ........................................................................... 21 
3.1.6 Geopolitics After The Cold War Era .............................................................. 28 
3.2 Constructivism and Critical Geopolitics ................................................................ 29 
3.2.1 Precursors of constructivist theory and their implications .............................. 33 
ix 
 
3.2.2 Deliberations on Constructivism .................................................................... 34 
3.2.2.1 Structure ...................................................................................................... 34 
3.2.2.2 Norms .......................................................................................................... 35 
3.2.2.3 Actors .......................................................................................................... 35 
3.2.2.4 Identity ........................................................................................................ 36 
3.2.3 Constructivism and Critical Geopolitics ......................................................... 36 
3.2.4 Critical Geopolitics ......................................................................................... 37 
3.2.4.1 Formal geopolitics ....................................................................................... 38 
3.2.4.2 Practical geopolitics .................................................................................... 39 
3.2.4.3 Popular geopolitics ...................................................................................... 40 
3.2.4.4 Structural geopolitics .................................................................................. 41 
CHAPTER 4 ......................................................................................................................... 44 
4 SOFT POWER DURING THE POST-COLD WAR ERA ........................................... 44 
CHAPTER 5 ......................................................................................................................... 49 
5 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ................................................................................ 49 
CHAPTER 6 ......................................................................................................................... 57 
6 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE RULE OF JUSTICE AND 
DEVELOPMENT PARTY ................................................................................................... 57 
CHAPTER 7 ......................................................................................................................... 62 
7 THE TURKISH COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AGENCY (TIKA)........ 62 
7.1 Projects by TIKA ................................................................................................... 66 
CHAPTER 8 ......................................................................................................................... 74 
8 ROLE OF TIKA AS A MAIN PROVIDER OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
FOR TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY................................................................................... 74 
CHAPTER 9 ......................................................................................................................... 82 
9 HOW DOES TIKA DETERMINE DONEE COUNTRIES? ........................................ 82 
9.1 Geographical Distribution of TIKA’s Development Assistance ........................... 84 
x 
 
9.2 Major Factors Influencing TIKA’s Choice of Locations for Development 
Assistance .......................................................................................................................... 87 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 90 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
Table of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Types of Geopolitical Theorists ..................................................................................... 17 
Figure 2: Geopolitical Theoreticians ............................................................................................. 18 
Figure 3: Amount of Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Certain Countries ............... 31 
Figure 4: Yearly Change of ODA ................................................................................................. 32 
Figure 5: Critical Geopolitical Coverage ...................................................................................... 43 
Figure 6: Declarations, Year, Conference Name & Goals of Development Aids ........................... 51 
Figure 7: Bilateral aid to former colonies, 1970 to 1994 ............................................................... 53 
Figure 8: DAC List of ODA Recipients ........................................................................................ 56 
Figure 9: Organizational Scheme of TIKA in 2005 ....................................................................... 63 
Figure 10: Organizational Scheme of TIKA in 2016 ..................................................................... 65 
Figure 11: Scheme of Turkey’s Development Assistances ............................................................ 67 
Figure 12: Types of Official Development Assistance Provided by Turkey ................................... 69 
Figure 13: Program Coordination Offices of TIKA ....................................................................... 71 
Figure 14: Development Aids Provided Turkey between 2002-2014 ............................................. 79 
Figure 15: Net Official Development Aids Provided by Turkey .................................................... 81 
Figure 16: Budgets Allocated by TIKA for Development Assistance (Continent by continent) ..... 83 
Figure 17: Yearly Changes in Budgets Allocated by TIKA for Development Assistance............... 87 
Figure 18: Yearly Changes in Budgets Allocated by TIKA for Development Assistance............... 88 
Figure 19: Relations between Soft Power, Turkish Foreign Policy, Development Aids and TIKA . 91 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
World politics faced inevitable changes after the end of the Cold War. Following the 
war, states started to encounter conflicts as a result of the obscurity and ambiguity caused 
by the new situation in world politics that was yet to be defined. Classical geopolitical 
theories as well as the realist theory failed to help states fulfill their needs regarding the 
field of foreign policy. The reason for this is that international relations in the post-war era 
were largely shaped by unidimensional policies that were basically centered upon the state 
itself and its security and were incapable of complying with the new perspectives of world 
politics. Nonetheless, constructivism as a theory emerged by giving reference to multi-
dimensionality in the world politics. Constructivism attached importance to cultures, norms 
and traditions so as to explain newly-developed world politics, thereby giving rise to a new 
and expanded perspective of political approach. 
That new perspective reverberated through the classical geopolitical theories, as well. 
Contrary to former geopolitical approaches that were strictly based on security and state-
centric started to change after the war, as they were incapable of responding to the 
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international conflicts. Geopolitics itself was changing ideologically, which is why a new 
phenomenon that is now named after ‘critical geopolitics’ emerged as an answer to the 
relevant alterations in the understanding of world politics. 
Such changes and adoption of new understandings gave rise to other issues to be 
tackled in the international arena: the least developed countries. With the new international 
order resulting from the changing dynamics following the end of the Cold War, world 
politics had to deal with many pressing difficulties in their relations with the 
underdeveloped countries of the world. Within this framework, constructivism and critical 
geopolitics emerged as solid theoretical grounds helping states in their relations with the 
underdeveloped countries. Thus, the concepts of development goals and development 
assistance emerged under these assumptions.  
In light of the objective of this study that is centered on the Turkish foreign policy in 
terms of development assistance, it is essential to note that foreign policies adopted by the 
country officials have gone through colossal transformation in the 21
st
 century under the 
rule of the Justice and Development Party (JDP).  
The flagship institution with regard to the development assistance provided by 
Turkey, TIKA restructured its organization and expanded its range of activity from Turkic 
countries to the entire world. Therefore, it is fair to purport that TIKA did not have to limit 
itself with small geographical areas for provision of development assistance under the 
policies driven by the current JDP government. The agency is continuing to expand the 
scope of its activities thanks to the general foreign policies triggered and implemented by 
the ruling party. Or, in other words, the general Turkish foreign policy-makers, 
instrumentalized TIKA as the main official development assistance provider in Turkey, as 
well as a soft power implementer in the international arena. 
The second chapter of the dissertation is dedicated to a clear definition of the term 
geopolitics, elaboration on its roots and emergence, as well as its most distinctive properties 
impacting the world politics. The third chapter, on the other hand, is to deliberate on 
realism and constructivism within the scope of the main theme of this study. A comparative 
analysis of relations and connotations between realism and classical geopolitical theories, 
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as well as constructivism and critical geopolitics is also presented in the third chapter so as 
to better comprehend the probable implications of development assistance from theoretical 
perspective. This analysis involves explanation of classical geopolitical theories and the 
relevant transformation process geopolitics have been undergoing from the 20
th
 to the 21
st
 
century. The fourth chapter is to better understand the Turkish case with regard to the 
emergence of soft power and its significance in terms of foreign policies implemented by 
the Turkish government. The fifth chapter, in this regard, proposes a categorization of 
development assistance and the motivations behind the urge to offer support to other 
countries in their developmental processes. In line with the evaluation of geopolitical 
policies specific to the Turkish case in the previous chapter, relevant development 
assistance offered by Turkey to other countries will also be elaborated in this chapter; 
whereas the sixth chapter will solely concentrate on a brief review of Turkish foreign policy 
approaches under the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) so that the motive behind 
Turkish support to overall development of countries is thoroughly comprehended. The 
transformation of geopolitical approaches within the body of the general Turkish foreign 
policies shall also be analyzed at this point. There has been a shift from classical 
geopolitics to critical geopolitics. It is essential to understand the reflections of such a 
transformation on the development assistance decisions. 
In the next chapter, TIKA and its organizational structure, as well as its current and 
future projects are introduced for drawing a clear picture of Turkish policies of reinforcing 
development in other countries. This is followed by an explanation of TIKA’s role as the 
main development assistance provider of Turkey. The ninth chapter is dedicated for 
explication of the methods TIKA uses in determining the donee countries for development 
assistance. Finally, the concluding chapter will dwell on the hierarchical relations among 
the implementation of soft power, Turkish foreign policy, TIKA and its development 
assistance. The question of the ways TIKA is used as a tool for Turkish foreign policy and 
the relevant motives for Turkey to offer development assistance will also be covered, 
analyzing TIKA as a significant factor in implementing soft power within the scope of 
Turkey’s foreign policies.  
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In this framework, the distinguishing feature of this dissertation is that the 
constructivist policies and critical geopolitics will be the guiding factor in analyzing the 
changing paradigms of the Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish soft power and development 
assistances. As a result, the question whether the TIKA provides development assistances 
to the relevant donee countries as an implementation of Soft Power in Turkish Foreign 
Policy will be answered on the basis of thorough analyses in the dissertation. 
Furthermore, the dissertation will feature explanations on classical realism and 
classical geopolitics at the first parts of the third chapter in order to prove that classical 
realism and classical geopolitics do not provide a thorough understanding as per the soft 
power, development assistances and changing paradigms of the Turkish Foreign Policy. 
Therefore, the use constructivism and critical geopolitics will be scrutinized in order to 
provide a better and solid comprehension of soft power, development assistances and 
changing paradigms in the overall Turkish Foreign Policy.  
This dissertation is framed on the basis of qualitative analysis methods. Case study 
method of analysis – focusing generally on a single case that is the TIKA – as such an 
analysis yields more detailed results compared to other methods. Additionally, the method 
of case study analysis ensures a thorough exploration of any specific case such as that of 
TIKA in this dissertation. Another factor contributing to the adoption of this method in the 
study is that analysis of data regarding development assistance by TIKA is more feasible 
with case study approach rather than other methods, as it paves the way for adaptation as 
well as production of unique data for international implementation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
2 DEFINITION OF GEOPOLITICS AND ITS ORIGINS 
 
 
 
 
What is geopolitics? This question may be answered in numerous ways. As such, 
there are detailed as well as brief and short definitions present for the term geopolitics. 
However, the most comprehensive definition of the term can be attained through 
conducting researches on the preliminary geopolitical theories. The Foreign Policy 
Research Institute’s (FPRI) researchers are deemed to offer the most relevant and simplest 
definition of geopolitics. According to these researchers, geopolitics is an approach 
studying international relations in connection with culture, geography and history (Granieri, 
2015, p. 492). Robert Strausz-Hupé defines, on the other hand, geopolitics as a better way 
to ponder on the world affairs. Elaborating on the world affairs, Hupé indeed underlines the 
long-term conflicts around the world shaped by historical and geographical facts (Kurth, 
2005, p. 571). This study is formalized on the idea that geopolitics is an alternative 
approach in understanding international relations in connection with geographical and 
historical traits. Nonetheless, this definition of geopolitics faced a process of considerable 
transformation after the Cold War. Traditions, norms and cultures were incorporated into 
the definition of geopolitics in order to be able to explain the recent developments in world 
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politics, which, in turn, gave rise to the emergence of - critical geopolitical perspective in 
analysis of politics. 
Geopolitics was regarded as a sub-discipline of social sciences throughout the 19
th
 
century. Notwithstanding the proliferation of geopolitical theories since then, all these 
theories have been centered upon explaining world politics and international relations via 
their linkages geographical and historical properties of the countries. The concepts of 
culture, shared knowledge, norms and identities have become inseparable parts of 
geopolitics following the collapse of the Soviet Union
1
. In that, world politics that have 
been under transformation ever since the collapse of the union have led various 
theoreticians to develop a new approach of critical geopolitics.  
One fact that needs notice is that geopolitical theories came to light by means of the 
international relations theories. As a matter of fact, classical geopolitics is assumed to be 
centered on the concepts of security and power, as in realist theories. Classical geopolitical 
theories claim that the international politics are executed by states with aspirations for 
security and power. Within this framework, theoreticians define geography as a natural 
granting that may turn into an element of power for states. In other words, classical 
geopolitical theories interpret natural or God-given geographical territories as a means to 
state power; advocates of classical geopolitics even endeavor to transform such 
geographical features of countries into an element of state power in the international 
politics. As for constructivist ideologies, critical geopolitics is all about cultures, norms and 
shared meanings in a country. Constructivists argue that it is the people who construct 
culture, norms, rules and collective memories and geopolitics is also a part of such human-
made values. Critical geopolitics, on the other hand, refers to construction of geopolitical 
perspectives and geopolitical identities. To put it another way, critical geopolitics 
deconstruct natural or God-given geographical properties under the influence of cultures, 
norms, identities and shared knowledge of people. 
 
                                                          
1 Realism was the dominant theory in the international relations during the Cold War. During that time, classical 
geopolitics started to develop by the impact of realism. During the Cold War, security was the main issue for states. 
However, norms, culture and shared knowledge gained importance later with the rise of constructivism. The next chapter 
will be dedicated to explain the complex relations between realism and classical geopolitics, as well as constructivism and 
critical geopolitics. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
3 THEORIES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
GEOPOLITICS 
 
 
 
 
What is a theory? It is a frame of empirical evidence obtained via testing various 
hypotheses. Nearly all social scientists characterize hypotheses in accordance with the 
circumstances they emerge under. If relevant predictions and estimations with regard to a 
specific hypothesis come true, such hypothesis is converted into an accepted theory in later 
stages. When a theory is authenticated in the next step, it is then identified as a single 
unified agreement among theoreticians. Yet, authentication of theories is generally 
impossible in social sciences due to large numbers of variables in their contexts.  
As a testing environment such as a social laboratory is not likely to function to 
measure such variables, it is generally challenging to put theories under scrutiny or testing. 
Hence, social sciences involve numerous theories. Being one of the disciplines categorized 
under social sciences, the field of international relations hosts a considerable amount of 
theories, as well as many sub-disciplines to explain certain issues in detailed manner. 
Geopolitics is one of these sub-disciplines under the body of the field of international 
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relations. Therefore, geopolitical theories inevitable have been affected by theories of 
international relations. Under these circumstances, it would be fair to deduce that the 
geopolitical theories well demonstrate certain features similar to those of international 
relations. More specifically, classical geopolitical theories were largely affected by realism, 
whereas critical geopolitical theories were shaped partly by constructivist ideas due to the 
changing world politics. In brief, theories of international relations can be put forward as a 
means to explain the bigger picture, while geopolitical theories are of help in 
comprehending more complex details in international politics. 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Classical Realism and Geopolitical Theories 
 
 
 
As is well known, World War I and II paved the way for profound changes in the area 
of international politics, as well. Especially after the World War II, radical changes started 
to be observed in the international relations. Emerging just before the war, realist ideology 
came to prominence immediately after the termination of the World War II with the impact 
of mistrustful and insecure relations among countries. 
Realism is one of the significant and well-known international relations theories. As a 
simple definition, realism explains international relations through power. It emerged as a 
reaction to idealism
2
. Realists attach great importance to power rather than morals. 
According to realists, state actions are directly related to their relative power compared to 
other states. No matter what states defend as ideologies, religious beliefs and economic 
systems; power is the only driving force for states in taking actions in the international 
                                                          
2 Idealism emphasizes international law, morals and international organizations. Idealists believe that human nature is 
good and altruistic. They argue that the international system has a potential to facilitate cooperation among states to solve 
conflicts and problems (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2015, p. 85). 
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arena (Chambers, 2008, p. 935). Realists suppose that states take international decisions 
and put such decisions into action to their own benefit, and they tend to act as autonomous 
actors in the international field. Furthermore, they assert the absence of a central authority 
in the overall international system. 
Classical realism purports three main assumptions within its body. Firstly, realism 
has a pessimistic perspective of human nature. Secondly, classical realists regard 
international conflicts generally as matters resolvable by inflicting wars due to the anarchic 
structure of the international system. Thirdly, realism attaches great importance to the 
concept of national security (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013, p. 66). These assumptions and 
their relevance with the classical geopolitical theories will be later elaborated when realist 
theories are tackled in more detailed manner for assuring relevance.  
It is important to understand the general frame of realism so as to explain the actions 
by states in the international arena. Understanding realist assumptions will further enable 
comprehension of the common points of realism with classical geopolitical theories.  
 
 
 
3.1.1 Precursors of realist theory and their implications 
 
 
Realism has its roots in the ideologies and in-depth opinions of several philosophers. 
In a sense, each and every thought shared by those philosophers or thinkers at the time later 
became a piece of realism. 
With his outstanding work named History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides 
became the first writer to give life to realist assumptions in the political history of the 
world. His main objective by this work was to write a book for the next generations to 
explicate the reasons of the war between Athens and Sparta. According to Thucydides, the 
fundamental cause of that war was fear (Thucydides, 1974, p. 9) of a shift in the balance of 
power between Athens and Sparta (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 43). Thus and so, it was 
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Thucydides, who coined the terms fear and balance of power in the literature. Marking the 
key terminology of classical realism, these terms also found their places in classical 
geopolitical theories. One of the main objectives of the classical geopolitical theories was 
to ensure security for state(s). Such theories were basically about fear of international 
threats. Classical geopolitics developed conceptual strategies to prevent fear of other states. 
Such strategies involved states’ controlling lands, routes or continents that would provide 
security and prevent feeling threatened by other states. As it is not feasible to control routs, 
lands or continents without allies, the concept of balance of power also came into 
prominence for classical geopolitics. Thereby, it can be deduced that classical geopolitical 
theory offers alliances to control an area against rival(s). In this respect, classical 
geopolitics demonstrates similarities with classical realism in its core. 
Niccolò Machiavelli is another precursor of realist theory that spurred the world once. 
His primary focus was on security for common weal (Machiavelli, 2008, p. 90). Moreover, 
he also refers to the use of power advocates attaining more power, as well as preserving 
existent power and enhancing state authority in the international domain through power 
(Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 45). Machiavelli further claims “it is much safer to be feared 
than to be loved, if one must choose” (Machiavelli, 2008, p. 63). In comparison to classic 
geopolitical theory, his argument of controlling strategic territories may result in posing 
fear to other states. However, it can controversially be argued that such an action to pose 
fear may well be essential for assuring state security. It can be observed from these 
assessments that similarities between realism and classical geopolitics are non-negligible.  
Another precursor of realist ideology, Thomas Hobbes mainly contributed to the 
development of realism with the term state of nature, which, in Hobbesian terms comes to 
mean societies free of government control (Hobbes, Flathman, & Johnston, 1997). Defined 
in such a way, the state of nature demonstrates similarities with the international system, as 
there is no central authority in the international system from the perspective of realists. In 
other words, the system overall is anarchic. In turn, the anarchic structure of the 
international system leads to a constant need of ensuring state security. In this respect, the 
underlining reason paving the way for the formation and stimuli of classical geopolitics was 
to ensure security of state(s) in an environment that lacked an international authority to put 
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state interactions into order. Advocates of classical geopolitical theory recognize the fact 
that the international system is anarchic in structure, as well. In doing so, these 
theoreticians purported certain ideologies under this discipline to obstruct threats coming 
from the anarchic international system, which further proves resemblances between 
classical realism and geopolitical theories.  
Hans Morgenthau is an ardent realist theoretician. He is the one who, for the first 
time, defined principles of political realism (Mogenthau & Thompson, 1997, pp. 4-11). 
These principles are as follows: 
“1- Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature 
(Mogenthau & Thompson, 1997, p. 4).  
2- Interest is defined in terms of power.  
3- The kind of interest determining political action depends on the political and 
cultural context, within which foreign policy is formulated (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 51).  
4- There is tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful 
political action (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013, p. 75).  
5- Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation.  
6- Interest is defined as power. (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 51).” 
Like other realist theoreticians, Morgenthau refers to the concepts of state, interest 
and power as the basics of the ideology. Classical geopolitical theories assume control of 
specific areas as a source of power in the international relations. Controlling or seizing 
land(s) may be immoral. However, it may well be a successful political action that is 
essential for security or interests of state(s). As a matter of fact, supporters of classical 
geopolitics do not necessarily evaluate the essentials of the theory on the basis of morality, 
which constitutes another proof for analogous features with those of classical realism. 
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3.1.2 Deliberations on realism 
 
 
 
3.1.2.1 The state 
 
 
States are the most prominent compounds of realist theory, being the key unitary 
actors in the international realm. This theory is basically defined as a set of principles, all of 
which are in favor of states as sovereign units. As such, other terms flourishing within the 
scope of the realist theory such as the national security, international system, and power 
politics all demonstrate the core value of states for this conceptualization. On the other 
hand, states are also vital for the classical geopolitics as the key actors in the international 
system. The classical geopolitical understandings propose methods for guaranteeing state 
security.  
 
 
 
3.1.2.2 The international system 
 
 
The realist assumption that the international system is anarchic does not necessarily 
implicate an international system without any rules or norms. Rather, it implicates the 
absence of central authority governing the international system to impose certain kind of 
rules or sanctions on states. In this sense, each and every state within the system has 
sovereignty in its own territory. This argument suggests that governments are entitled to act 
freely in their territories (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2015, p. 92). Nevertheless, there is no 
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sovereignty in the international system, as all states are equal on theoretical basis (Viotti & 
Kauppi, 2012, p. 56). Anarchic structure of the international system feeds into production 
of security-based policies by states, putting extensive efforts to ensure their own security in 
the anarchic environment. Yet, such a constant pursuit leads to what theoreticians call a 
security-dilemma. In an attempt to protect their sovereignties, states opt for taking up arms 
against other states, which ultimately leads to armament of the other states largely due to a 
perception of threat of a probable violation of their sovereignties (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 
56). One of the devastating consequences of such a security dilemma may be on their 
economic well-being, as tremendous amounts of spending on arms will lead up to budget 
deficits. To figure out a way to solve this problem, the concept of balance of power 
becomes an option. Balance of power is frequently defined as equation of power of one 
state to another state(s). Balance of power can only be achieved possible through alliances 
among states so as to obstruct any probable aggressive attack on one another.  
Furthermore, there are classical geopolitical theories to encourage precautions and 
measures against the anarchic situation of the international system. In that, classical 
geopolitics, as an ideology, requires establishment of alliances among states. All classical 
geopolitical theories and theorems suggest controlling of territories/continents for states to 
guarantee sovereignty in the international domain. However, a state cannot have the ability 
to control all territories or continents, even if it is the most powerful state in the world. For 
this reason, establishing alliances to ensure balance of power is a core theme within the 
scope of the classical geopolitics. 
 
 
 
3.1.2.3 Power 
 
 
For realists, the key concept governing the practices in the international arena is 
power. Despite the fact that defining and measuring power is rather challenging, realists 
have made use of two major perspectives in order to be able to define the concept of power. 
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First is that power is the sum of a state’s economic, technological, military and other 
capabilities. Here, the concept of relativity is of note, as it will impact the perception of 
state capabilities. States have comparatively relative capacities, and this is a static and 
materialistic status. The second perspective can be qualified as one that is more dynamic 
than this first perspective: It is similarly based on the recognition of relative state 
capabilities, while the concept of power is also defined through interactive relations 
between states. To put it in different way, states’ influence over other states specifies their 
level of power, as well (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 52). 
The concept of power is composed of several compounds including gross national 
products, population, territory, geography, and natural resources among others (Goldstein 
& Pevehouse, 2015, p. 90) and such compounds may well be utilized in measuring how 
states powerful are. It is not surprising that these power compounds are also found in the 
classical geopolitics, as similarities between realist and geopolitical assumptions are 
already established in the beginning of this study. As a matter of fact, the classical 
geopolitical understanding is regarded to put in the forefront state properties as territory, 
geography and natural resources as elements of power in their relations to other states 
(Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2015, p. 91). States aspire to own or impose control over natural 
resources and strategic territories in order to assure security for themselves (and their allies) 
and limit actions by rivals. Enhancing military capacity and controlling strategic routes or 
regions neighboring their rivals are significant focal points for states in such an 
international political setting. It can fairly be deduced from these facts that classical realism 
inspires classical geopolitical theories. As a result of the fundamental need for state 
security, classical geopolitical theories were shaped on the basis of an attempt to offer 
ideological ground for ensuring general security for the states
3
 in their view of world 
politics, which are deeply associated with realism that uses power politics as a tool for 
ensuring national security (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013, p. 66); and as previously mentioned, 
classical geopolitical theories demonstrate power as one of their basic properties. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Classical geopolitical theories and their security-based perspectives will be explicated in the next chapter in detail. 
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3.1.3 Classical Realism and Classical Geopolitics 
 
 
From the previous analyses, it is easy to understand the extent to which classical 
geopolitical theories have borrowed from the main principles of realism. As can be 
remembered, Thucydides used fear as one of the main assumptions in his realist theories, 
claiming that wars were mainly the results of fear. Machiavelli tried to rationalize conflicts 
with the sense of fear, as well. Being also an element frequently referred to in classical 
geopolitics, the perception of threat paves the way for formation of almost identical 
assumptions out of common concerns in both realism and geopolitical theory. To avert 
possible negative consequences of threats in the international arena, geopolitical 
assumptions propose states to have dominance over territories and geographies. However, 
establishing dominance on certain territories may result in fear, which will later turn into a 
perception of threat by other relevant states. Yet, some states still consider it to be 
significant for their interests. Letting this fact aside, states are generally considered to 
prioritize security out of several reasons less than the fear factor.  
Hobbes’s state of nature applies to the structure of the international system. The 
anarchic composition of the system results in a deep need of security due to the fact that 
lack of an international authority gives rise to incrementing threat perceptions. Classical 
geopolitics deem it possible to reduce the level of such threat perceptions and enhance 
security among states through containment and dominancy over strategic territories (i.e. 
heartland, air, sea or lands). Morgenthau refers to the fact that “there is tension between 
moral commands and successful political action” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013, p. 75). In this 
scale, classical geopolitics is believed to attach great importance to successful political 
actions rather than moral values. In other words, state interests and security concerns 
supersede moral values for most of the governments. In light of this fact in mind, it can be 
observed that all classical geopolitical studies benefited from the most basic principles of 
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realism until the end of the Cold War. In that, the Cold War era was the time when 
geopolitical studies prospered at the highest level. Yet, that era cannot be necessarily 
assumed as a golden age for geopolitics. The fact that Hitler utilized geopolitics to 
legitimize his aggressive actions resulted in a complete value loss of geopolitics in the eyes 
of the European intellectuals and academicians toward the end of 1940s. Academicians and 
theorists in continental Europe approached cautiously toward geopolitics simply because of 
this reason. Later, the argument that geopolitics is a tool or a way of manipulation for 
legitimatization of state acts gained more support. Still, it was the Anglo-American 
academicians, who backed the geopolitical conceptions and raised them into prominence 
once again. Under those circumstances, various sub-theories emerged in order to be able to 
explain and understand the motives of the Cold War’s parties. These relevant sub-theories 
were later transformed into debates and counter-debates asserting that the geopolitical 
theories emerged and developed in order to understand, explain and develop a point of view 
about world politics. 
The end of the Cold War marked the loss of importance in classical geopolitics. The 
collapse of bipolarity in world politics following the end of the war reduced and alleviated 
the perceptions of threat, which resulted in main classical geopolitics to lose their ground in 
the literature of international relations. Herewith, scholars then started to develop new 
geopolitical theories to catch up with the new shape of world politics, which indicates a 
transitional period taking place after the Cold War. During this period, theorists used the 
consequences of the Cold War to explain world politics with new theories. However, that 
transitional period did not last long due to, again, the world politics. Thereby, 
constructivism came up with a different perspective to clarify the world politics, which also 
changed the dynamics of geopolitics, converting it into critical geopolitics following the 
afore-mentioned transitional period.  
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3.1.4 Geopolitical Theories 
 
 
Geopolitical theories may be classified as classical geopolitics and critical 
geopolitics. Classical geopolitics dominated the political literature until the end of the Cold 
War. However, critical geopolitics did not emerge suddenly after the Cold War. There was 
a transitional period between the times when classical geopolitics and critical geopolitics 
were dominant and preemptive. 
 
Figure 1: Types of Geopolitical Theorists 
 
 
 
 
3.1.5 Classical Geopolitics 
 
 
To comprehend geopolitical theories thoroughly, their origins and properties shall be 
analyzed in detail. As stated before, geopolitics became a discipline under social sciences in 
the 19
th
 century, yielding two major assumptions: The “Organic state” and “Geo-strategic 
state” (Glassner & de Blij, 1989, pp. 223-236).  
Geopolitics 
Classical 
Geopolitics 
Transitional 
Period Theories 
Critical 
Geopolitics 
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Figure 2: Geopolitical Theoreticians  
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Saul Bernard Cohen 
George Frost Kennan  
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3.1.5.1 The organic state perspective 
 
 
The organic state perspective of classical geopolitics was largely inspired by the 
concept of Social Darwinism. Accordingly, all living creatures including people and 
animals are in constant struggle for their existence and survival in the world. Social 
Darwinism puts forward that only the fittest may survive. Advocates of the organic state 
perspective borrowed this understanding from Social Darwinism and adapted it to the 
geopolitics. They claimed that states are all living organisms. Living organisms need food 
to maintain their lives. From this perspective, new lands are regarded as food for states. 
Therefore, all states need new lands to be able to survive and maintain their existence. The 
rule of survival of the fittest applies to the states in the international arena, as well (Tezkan 
& Taşar, 2013, p. 28). With Hitler denouncing the organic state understanding, the classical 
geopolitics was divided into two groups after the WWII. The terms “Lebensraum” and 
“Grossraum” were products of organic state perspective. During the 3rd Reich, the organic 
state perspective provided legitimacy for the German invasion of Europe. Hitler always 
argued that Germany needs a vast living space survive, which he legitimized with the idea 
of organic state. 
Friedrich Ratzel was one of the first geopolitical theorists. Nearly all geopolitical 
theories focusing on the organic state perspective were based on Ratzel’s works. Thus, 
Friedrich Ratzel is considered to be a significant figure formalizing the concept of 
geopolitics. He was the first scholar to systemize geopolitics as a discipline under social 
sciences. According to Ratzel, “a state is a living organism and cannot be contained within 
rigid limits” (Ratzel, 1898, p. 351). His theory was based on several general principles: A 
state has to expand in order to survive, as it is an organic structure. As a matter of fact, 
Ratzel suggested exemplifying his assertion that Germany needed a “Lebensraum” or 
“vital-space”. He also declared that only states, which have large territorial areas, have the 
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potential to be a world power. U.S.A and China have that potential, but Germany does not, 
as enlarging its borders in the European continent was far too difficult (Smith, 1980, pp. 
51-68). For that reason, Ratzel suggested that Germany could enlarge its lands and create 
its lebensraum in different continents rather than Europe. There are two fundamental stages 
of Ratzel’s theory: First stage is Lebensgebiete. It means configuration of national territory. 
Second stage is Lebesnraum. It means vital space or living space for states (Costachie & 
Damian, 2010, p. 302). For the first time, Friedrich Ratzel adapted Social Darwinism in his 
theory. Ratzel built his theory on three pillars, which are natural selection, survival of the 
fittest and positivism. His theory became an inspiration and cornerstone of organic state 
perspective of classical geopolitics (Tezkan & Taşar, 2013, p. 28). 
Rudolf Kjellen is another geopolitical theorist, who advocates organic state 
perspective. He was a student of Ratzel and it is easy to see that he was affected by Ratzel’s 
geopolitical assumptions (Tuathail, 1996, p. 34). Hence, Kjellen also defends the idea that 
“state is a living organism” as much as Ratzel. Rudolf Kjellen found his theories on five 
basic principles: geopolitics, demo-politics, eco-politics, socio-politics and krato-politics. 
Elaborating on these basic concepts; the first one - geopolitics - is about state policies 
departing from their geographical conditions (Holdar, 1992, p. 312). The second one, 
demo-politics, defines harmonious soul of citizens of states (Holdar, 1992, p. 313). Eco-
politics attempts at formation of policies on the basis of the economic statuses of states 
(Holdar, 1992, p. 313). Holdar proposed that international trade is for creating dependence 
on great powers. Furthering, socio-politics is asserted by the same scholar as a sub-
discipline analyzing the state as a society (Holdar, 1992, p. 313). Finally, kroto-policts is 
investigating the relations between states and their subjects (Holdar, 1992, p. 313).  
In the same study, Kjellen classified states in two groups as world powers and great 
powers within the scope of the above-mentioned five basic principles. Therefore, he 
qualified Germany, England, U.S.A. and Russia as world powers; whereas Japan, Italy, 
France and Austria-Hungary as great powers (Holdar, 1992, p. 314). 
Karl Haushofer was one of the significant classical geopolitical theorists working on 
the organic state perspective. He believed that the Versailles Treaty was holding Germany 
under strict limits, leaving the country with practically no range of movement. For this 
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reason, he strongly argued that the limitation imposed by the treaty should be abolished. He 
published a journal called Zeitschrift für Geopolitik in order to take action in removing the 
relevant limitations imposed by the Versailles Treaty through spreading his ideas. Rudolf 
Hess was one of the supporters and students of Haushofer in Munich University. Hess 
absorbed all teachings of the Professor about Germany’s geographical need for more living 
space. (Irving, 1987, p. 10). During the time of Hitler’s imprisonment, Haushofer gave him 
a copy of Ratzel’s works precisely when Hitler was dictating Mein Kampf (Stoakes, 1986). 
After that, Hitler borrowed and used the concept of Lebensraum in his work as an essential 
point. The Nazi concept of Lebensraum (borrowed from Ratzel) justified German territorial 
expansion in Mitteleuropa (Middle Europe) (Burleigh, 1998, p. 50). Although the idea of 
organic state was abandoned when Germany lost in WWII, the terms Lebensraum and 
Grossraum were imbedded in the history and remained in the political literature as concepts 
useful in explaining imperialistic desires of states. 
All being classical geopolitical theorists, who defended the idea of organic state 
structures, Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen and Karl Haushofer can be deduced to share the 
idea that “state is a living organism”. Social Darwinism impacted all three scholars, and 
their works in a way inspired Adolf Hitler. Their idea of organic state faded following the 
end of WWII, though.  
 
 
 
3.1.5.2 Geo-Strategic perspective 
 
 
In the post-WWII period, geopolitics lost its academic value in the eyes of European 
scholars, yet came into prominence in the U.S. American scholars leaned on the geo-
strategic ideologies in line with the political developments in their country. The 
geostrategic approach, thus, was linked with the geopolitical theories within the body of the 
IR. The U.S. scholars’ understanding of geopolitics differed from those of Europeans. 
Accordingly, their geo-strategic understanding was based on the course of actions by states 
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in the extensive international geographic area (Tezkan & Taşar, 2013, p. 29). That vast 
geographic area may be denoting specific areas such as the oceans, airspace or lands. As a 
matter of fact, the geo-strategic theories generally offer a global view
4
 to states, arguing 
that geo-strategic locations of states lead to opportunities as well as limitations in states’ 
power and their influence. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, who was an admiral of the U.S. Navy, published his work 
named “The Influence of Sea Power upon History” underlining the centrality of naval 
power in the rise of the British Empire in the 17
th
 century (Varacalli, 2016, p. 116). He 
concluded in this study that the U.S. should aim to acquire superiority as a naval force in 
the world. To put it another way, the U.S.A. should control all seas and oceans in the world 
in order to increase its trade volume and protect trade routes it is operating on. Mahan was 
also an ardent supporter of the open-door policy
5
 implemented by the U.S. President 
Woodrow Wilson. He argued that controlling oceans in the world was essential and, in fact, 
an inseparable part of the American foreign policies, being specifically the open door 
policy. His theory further supported Wilson’s famous fourteen points. To illustrate this, it 
would be of note to look at specifically the 2
nd
 principle proposed by Wilson. This second 
principle is formulated as the absolute freedom of navigation on seas and oceans at times of 
peace and even war (Kaymaz, 2007, pp. 145-174). In his theory, Mahan suggested that 
superior naval forces are essential in having the freedom of navigation on seas. Wilson’s 3rd 
principle is about clearing away all sorts of economic barriers, and setting equal conditions 
for trade among all nations, which is ardently supported by Mahan (Kaymaz, 2007, pp. 
145-174). Defending the idea of powerful and superior naval forces, Mahan also deemed it 
a prerequisite for states to have very powerful merchant navies that would empower them 
in business terms.  
Although the geo-strategic point of view came to light only after the WWII, Mahan’s 
above-mentioned views reflect similarity with the geo-strategic theories. Mahan was the 
first scholar, who argues that dominance on certain areas of international relations would 
pay off. He exemplified this idea by pointing out to the American actions in the world 
                                                          
4 Global view denotes focus on the entire world by the theoreticians. 
5 The open door policy was articulated with a series of notes in 1899-1900 by John Hay, who was then the U.S. Secretary 
of State. According to these notes, the U.S.A. demanded equal opportunity for trade in China. Moreover, Hay emphasized 
territorial integrity for China. Lately, the open door policy transformed from regional to global perspective for the U.S. 
foreign policy thanks to Woodrow Wilson. 
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politics. He found a strong relation between the U.S.A.’s geo-strategic position and its 
power exerted in world politics, bringing light to both its limitations and advantages. For 
that matter, Mahan became the pioneering scholar, who envisaged geo-strategic views and 
their consequences even before such views were born toward the end of the 19
th
 century. 
Sir Halford Mackinder was another geopolitical theorist, who was also on the geo-
strategic side of geopolitical theories. He named his theory as the “Heartland” and declared 
it for the first time in the Royal Geographic Society. His theoretical work came into 
prominence, though, with his second work known as the Democratic Ideals and Reality 
(Mackinder, 1919), where he amplified the theoretical frame of geopolitics via two 
objectives superficially for Great Britain: Britain shall retain its colonies and maintain its 
status as a great power. Coining the term world-island for describing Europe, Africa and 
Asia (Tezkan & Taşar, 2013, p. 91), he divided the world into several parts in political 
terms. 
To him, railways and dominance over lands was crucial for Europe due to the 
continent’s closed water system. Accordingly, the world was divided into three different 
parts as the Heartland
6
, the Inner Crescent and the Outer Crescent. Mackinder argued that 
any state ruling or dominating Eastern Europe is, indeed, commanding the Heartland, or the 
world-island. Thus, he regarded the Heartland as the corner stone of the global relations 
(Tezkan & Taşar, 2013, pp. 91-93). Due to such a categorization of world in three main 
divisions, Mackinder could not anticipate any changes in the borders of states within 
Europe. 
A significant argument in Mackinder’s theory is that the probable coalition between 
Germany and Russia must definitely be prevented. Purporting that a Russian-German 
coalition would be a gruesome threat over other states, Mackinder offered a solution as 
blocking Russia and Germany from being neighbors to Britain. Instead, he defended the 
idea that small buffer zones (states) ruled by Britain should be present between German as 
well as Russian territory and Britain’s territory (Tezkan & Taşar, 2013, p. 87). Considering 
this argument, it can fairly be understood that Mackinder had a different approach toward 
the concept of balance of power. He believed that the so-called balance of power among the 
European states would absolutely be devastated, if Russia and Germany formed a coalition 
                                                          
6 Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Anatolia, Persia, Mongolia and a small part of China. 
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to align their forces. His theory, thus, indicates certain aspects of the geo-strategic political 
ideologies. He interpreted everything about geography in a way that benefited Great 
Britain. In other words, he formulated his views on geographical properties in an attempt to 
facilitate retaining of British colonies so that Britain could protect its then-status quo.  
Alexander Nikolaievich Prokofiev de Seversky, another scholar internalizing the geo-
strategic perspective, valued superior air forces in the international relations. However, 
what is striking about this scholar is that he set his theories in favor of the U.S.A., despite 
the fact that he was of Russian origin. In 1927, he obtained U.S. citizenship to continue his 
life in the U.S.A. He established the Seversky Aircraft Company in 1931 in the U.S.A. (The 
New York Times, 1936) and won his first tender in 1936 for a new United States Army Air 
Corps, signing his first military contract in 1936 for the production of Seversky P-35 
(Bodie, 1995, pp. 1-11). Due to his interest in air force, he based his theory on dominance 
in terms of air forces. In his book “Victory through Power” (Seversky, 1942) he argued that 
the theory of naval dominancy collapsed when the WWII broke out, as the Allied Forces 
did not sufficiently value air forces. He claimed that the key for winning the victory out of 
the WWII would be air forces sufficing to make the Axis countries succumb. Seversky’s 
second influential book “Air Power: Key to Survival” (Seversky, 1950) brought to light that 
land and air forces both were dependent heavily on air power. Within this framework, a 
state is obligated to have strong air forces in order to be able to establish its authority on 
lands and seas, as well. Therefore, Seversky regarded air power as the prominent 
component of a state’s military capacity. In doing so, he urged the U.S.A. to build a mighty 
air force within its military. Furthering his assertions, Seversky divided the world into two 
parts in terms of airspace: the industrial Heartlands of the U.S.A and U.S.S.R. What he 
called as the heartlands of those two major powers of the world could easily melt down the 
heartlands of other states in the international arena. Therefore, his idea was that the U.S.A. 
should close its naval bases to the other countries except the United Kingdom. 
Additionally, he controversially argued that the U.S.A. should avoid small-scale conflicts in 
order not to consume its military and financial power on unnecessary aspirations (Owens, 
1999, p. 65). As can easily be figured out, these assumptions can be related to the geo-
strategic theories, as Seversky explicitly praises dominance on a specific area for the 
25 
 
welfare of the states. As a matter of fact, he points out the opportunity that the U.S.A. 
would have, if it ruled dominance on airspaces. 
Geopolitical theories were affected by the Cold War and the following changes in the 
status quo of world politics. Thus, the geopolitical theories transformed gradually into a 
tool for Anglo-American theorists in order to develop strategies for Western dominance. In 
other words, the geo-strategic perspective of world politics attempted to hand over all 
favors of geopolitics as a social science discipline to the Anglo-American theorists.  
Known as the “Godfather of Containment” (Baofu, 2007, p. 91) during the Cold War 
era, scholar Nicholas J. Spykman was completely against the American isolationism. He 
claimed that the U.S.A. needed to follow active interventionist foreign policies in order to 
prevent any state from dominating Eurasia. This is the reason why he argued that if the 
U.S.A. followed isolationist policies, the European or – more accurately – the Western 
states would be exposed to threats. While the traditional geopolitical theoreticians have not 
distinguished geographical properties from other parameters in creating their assumptions; 
Spykman set a premium on geography is explicating state actions. This presumption can be 
proved by his own words uttering that “Ministers come and go; even dictators die, but 
mountain ranges stand unperturbed” (Spykman, 1938, p. 29). 
Actually, Spykman revised Mackinder’s theory. Proposing his theory of Heartland in 
a conference in 1942 (Tezkan & Taşar, 2013, p. 139), Spykman similarly divided the world 
into three parts, but with different categories this time: the Heartland, Rimland and Outer 
Islands/Continents. Spykman accepted Mackinder’s Heartland perspective, but he objected 
to the inner crescent. He, instead, defined what was called inner crescent as Rimland. 
Objecting to the idea that the Heartland means having extensive rule over the world, 
Spykman argues that the Rimland is also an essential part of global domination. In that, 
Spykman uttered “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, and who rules Eurasia holds the 
destiny of the world in their hands” (Tezkan & Taşar, 2013, pp. 139-140). In fact, his 
assertion of Rimland over the contradicting Heartland was targeting a containment policy 
over the Soviet Union. As a matter if fact, the U.S.A. needed to contain Russians on the 
Heartland to prevent probable Soviet expansion in the Rimland that would later ensure 
Soviet hegemony over the world. In this sense, he argued that the Eurasian coastal lands are 
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the key to set hegemony over the world due to their population size and rich resources 
(Cohen, 2015, p. 26). Spykman, too, claimed that the power politics was a major element in 
the anarchical international system. Therefore, he believed that only the great powers could 
follow a balance of power policy in the international system (Tezkan & Taşar, 2013, pp. 
141-142). In his theory, domination of a specific land clearly demonstrates basic principles 
of the geo-strategic ideology. In addition to that, Spykman’s arguments on power and 
balance of power point us out to the essentials of the classical realism. 
Saul Bernard Cohen was another geopolitical theorist from the U.S.A. As much as 
Mackinder and Spykman, he also adopted a global view
7
 in shaping his international 
relations theory. Differently from his counterparts, he divided the world into two parts: the 
Trade-Dependent Maritime World and the Eurasian Continental World. He further divided 
the Eurasian continental world into two parts: the Russian Heartland and Eastern Europe. In 
addition, he defined two shatter belt regions, which are the Middle East and Southeast Asia. 
These regions were controlled by the inconsistent states (Cohen, 2015, p. 68). Further, 
these were adjacent areas of interest for the Great Powers. As for the American policies, he 
argued that the U.S.A. should not implement containment policy on the entire world. 
Rather, the U.S.A. should use its sources more effectively instead of consuming all its 
power to overrule the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the U.S.A. needed to be selective in terms of 
supporting non-Communist countries. 
George F. Kennan, the Cold War geopolitical theorist, was an ardent implementer 
and strict defender of the containment policy that was created and developed by Spykman 
and Cohen. He was qualified as “one of the six Wise Men” by Walter Isaacson and Evan 
Thomas at the end of the Cold War (Isaacson & Thomas, 1986, pp. 17-37). Having a 
critical role in the implementation of the containment policy of the U.S.A., he strictly 
opposed to any cooperation with the Soviets to prevent the Soviet government’s plans from 
actualization. In 1946, Kennan
8
 issued his famous “Long Telegram” expressing his concern 
that Harry S. Truman and the main policy-makers in the U.S. ignored his view on the 
containment policy. In his 8000-word long telegram, he expressed his views on the 
necessity of “the containment policy”. After three years, in 1949, he published an article 
                                                          
7 Global view means that he focuses on entire world in holistic approach. 
8 Kennan was deputy head of the mission in Moscow in 1946.  
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“The Sources of Soviet Conduct” on the U.S. Foreign Affairs under the nickname “X” 
(Kennan, 1947). He argued in his article that the U.S.A. must see the Soviet Union as a 
rival, not a partner due to the expansionist desires of the Soviet Union. The categorization 
of the world – that became a tradition for scholars – was also present in his study: He 
divided the world into two parts as “Maritime Trading World” and “Despotic Xenophobic 
East” in analyzing the world affairs (Flint, 2006, p. 23). 
All in all, it would be fair to argue that nearly all theorists were affected by the 
bipolarity in the international system and the fierce competition between the U.S.S.R. and 
U.S.A. during the Cold War period. In that, theories attempting to construe the Cold War 
politics were largely departing from the classical realist theories on the international 
relations. One of these theories – as analyzed in previous chapters – the classical 
geopolitics attached great importance to states as unitary actors operating in the world 
system. Classical geopolitics offered strategies to states to guarantee their security or 
minimize the amount of international threats towards them. Correspondingly, the classical 
realist theories valued states as the key actors in the international arena, too. Departing from 
such a role, classical realists deemed the security of states critical and an indispensable part 
of their general policies. For this reason, the classical realist understanding endeavored to 
produce strategies to ensure state security.  
It is significant at this point to underline the fact that the classical geopolitical 
theories turned into sorts of geopolitical blocs to ensure a balance of power among states. 
Likewise, the classical realist understanding promoted a deep balance of power in the 
international arena so as to avert conflicts among states. 
As much as the classical realist theories argue that the international system is 
anarchic and there is no central authority, the classical geopolitics, in the same manner, 
recognized the anarchical situation of the international system. Thus, scholars working on 
the classical geopolitics struggled to produce way of ensuring prolific strategies to 
eliminate threats coming from the anarchic structure of the international system.  
Another resemblance between the classical realist and geopolitical conceptualizations 
is that they both value national security. And finally, power is a common issue for both 
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classical realists and classical geopolitical theoreticians. On the basis of these analyses, it is 
quite obvious that the classical geopolitical theories have made use of key features and 
concepts of the preceding classical realist theories.  
 
 
 
3.1.6 Geopolitics After The Cold War Era 
 
 
Now that the impact of realism on the classical geopolitics is settled in the previous 
scrutiny, it is of note to have a closer look to the major conceptualizations emerging 
especially during the course of the Cold War, as they were largely shaped by the world 
conjuncture and trajectory of states. The Cold War gave rise to a main concern of security 
for all states, and the need for individual state security was the primary topic of all theories. 
For nearly forty years and so, all states adopted actions in line with that security paradigm. 
When it comes to the end of the Cold War, however, this paradigm underwent a major 
shift. Both states and political scholars started gradually to accommodate themselves to the 
new features of the world politics. Certain theories, however, could not manage to survive 
in the post-Cold War era due to the uncertainties of the world situation.  
During 1980s, constructivism emerged as one of the most popular international 
relations theories in the world compared to the other political theories. States started to 
change their policies on protecting their existent status quo following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, as there was no more a bipolar world system in the world to pose threat from 
either party of the conflict. Under these circumstances, constructivism gained more and 
more strength in time. The international relations theoreticians, political advisors and 
decision-makers started to regard the geopolitics as a sub-discipline rather than a major 
theory. As a result, classical geopolitics lost its relevance, while certain of its assumptions 
remained untouched for certain areas of state politics. Many geopolitical theorists revised 
their theories and tried to adapt to the current ideologies that were becoming more relevant 
for the international system. That specific period is defined as a transitional period in this 
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study, as classical geopolitics did not extinguish completely, but transformed into critical 
geopolitics later in the course of the political history. For reference purposes, the major 
works on explaining this transitional period are as follows: Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “The 
Grand Chessboard”, Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization”, Alexander Dugin’s 
“Neo-Eurasianism” and Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History. These will not be further 
referred to in this study, as our topic does not cover the world politics after the end of the 
Cold War. 
 
 
 
3.2 Constructivism and Critical Geopolitics 
 
 
1980s can be regarded as the precise date of fundamental changes coming to light in 
the bipolar structure of the world politics. From this time on, states started to seek their 
individual self-interests rather than those of their camps. As a matter of fact, they started to 
develop new strategies to change the course of the world politics. Under these conditions, 
the classical geopolitics remained too static to be able to explain the new world system. The 
geographical location of states was no more relevant in most political analyses by 
academicians and intellectuals. As a result, a new form of the classical geopolitics was 
born: the critical geopolitics. 
At the same time, the international relations theories gave space to an understanding 
of social constructivism. There are five basic assumptions of social constructivism: 
1.  The main focus of social constructivism is on human consciousness 
and its position on world affairs (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013, p. 209).  
2. Constructivists reject to focus on materials primarily (Viotti & 
Kauppi, 2012, p. 278).  
3. Social constructivist theorists prioritize the social aspect of 
international relations (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013, p. 209).  
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4. Social constructivism argues that international relations should focus 
on thoughts, ideas and beliefs (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013, p. 209).  
5. Social constructivism accepts that states are actors of international 
relations. However, it also accepts that transnational organizations, international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations are also major actors of the 
international relations. In other words, social constructivism accepts that 
multilateralism has importance (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 279).  
6. Lastly, constructivism refers to the fact that the world is in a state of 
flux. In other words, the world is always under construction (Viotti & Kauppi, 
2012, p. 279). 
Many NGOs, international organizations and autonomous state organizations 
developed projects with states and they started to take part in foreign policies of states, as 
states sought ways to be more effective, useful and beneficial. What is more, states 
supported these organizations because it was cheaper than establishing and subsidizing 
state organizations. Indeed, these organizations became supporters of development in the 
least developed states due to the fact that economic development of the least developed 
states was one of the important aims of these organizations. Therefore, there was a win-win 
situation: states with economic power could increment their influence over the world, while 
the under-developed countries found the opportunity to better their economic statuses with 
the development assistance provided by the more developed countries. To put it another 
way, a multilateral perspective
9
 of constructivist ideology offers new types of cooperation 
that can be put into effect among states. In contrast to the classical geopolitics, the 
constructivist perspective deemed cooperation possible and feasible among states and 
NGOs or international organizations. 
However, NGOs and international organizations are not the leading organizations to 
provide development assistance/aids to recipient countries. Leading organizations for 
providing development aids are autonomous state organizations.  
 
                                                          
9 Multilateral perspective supports the idea of cooperation in general. All multilateral activities shall accordingly include 
cooperation (Caporaso, 1992, p. 603).  
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State/Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
U.S.A 13212.41 14825.42 16995.65 20460.58 24039.55 33005.5 26982.53 24339.53 
Sweden 3022.53 3084.47 3447.56 3361.31 3446.13 4293.63 4898.16 4792.25 
Netherland 5797.71 5801.07 5594.05 5440.38 5160.56 6153.73 6336.58 6495.76 
France 7298.78 7528.88 9156.97 9916.43 10359.29 12028.17 12324.72 10274.23 
Germany 8606.21 8668.69 8676.18 9112.39 9105.16 12102.75 12363.96 13131.94 
Australia 2383.16 2278.28 2385.04 2385.6 2432.43 2588.76 3151.08 3414.16 
United 
Kingdom 
6805.15 7178.52 7255.83 8245.45 9014.08 12029.12 13347.18 9440.49 
Japan 11848.56 9854.12 9728.62 8757.31 8320.74 12628.91 11453.47 8085.55 
South 
Korea 
306.23 420.94 416.88 503.74 544.58 856.8 482.37 703.62 
State/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
U.S.A 28968.53 31339.67 31854.21 32584.97 31672.18 31793.13 33095.5 30764.84 
Sweden 4997.66 5360.78 4989.45 5492.77 5302.99 5617.12 6232.72 8526.62 
Netherland 6757.74 6412.93 6610.27 6271.06 5824.35 5474.03 5572.97 6932.43 
France 10510.74 12564.77 13390.18 12721.89 12586.32 11397.48 10620.32 10919.14 
Germany 14060.78 12367.11 13866.27 14179.43 13877.4 14476.85 16566.2 20854.93 
Australia 3603.14 3550.83 3971.6 4405.38 4779.85 4541.47 4382.42 3896.61 
United 
Kingdom 
11846.52 13189.17 14968.42 14970.99 14967.5 19132.41 19305.7 19919.5 
Japan 8980.04 8032.04 9002.77 8357.31 8083.65 10748.76 9266.29 10418.15 
South 
Korea 
940.68 1060.53 1340.7 1427.09 1732.95 1835.26 1856.73 2010.5 
Figure 3: Amount of Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Certain Countries 
* Data based on U.S. Dollars 
(ODA, 2016) 
32 
 
 
Figure 4: Yearly Change of ODA 
(ODA, 2016) 
These figures demonstrate that development assistance has become an important 
instrument for states. The amount of development aids are pretty high, as can be observed 
from the above graphs. For this reason, states shaped their institutions and organizations in 
line with the new parameters of the world politics. The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) for U.S.A, Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA) for Sweden, State Council & Eximbank for China, 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS) for Netherland, Agence 
Française de Développement (AFD) for France, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
(GIZ) for Germany, Department for International Development (DFID) for United 
Kingdom, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid) for Australia, Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for Japan, Korea International Cooperation 
Agency (KOICA) for South Korea and the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency 
(TIKA) for Turkey are among the pioneering institutions within the main donor states that 
provide development assistance to the least developed countries of the world. 
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3.2.1 Precursors of constructivist theory and their implications 
 
 
Constructivism has its roots in the ideologies of several philosophers that have had a 
major influence on the emerging constructivist ideas back at the time. 
John Locke was one of the above-stated philosophers. He had a different 
perspective toward the state of nature that, accordingly, had a significant influence on 
constructivism. Locke argued that the state of nature is not a synonym to the state of war. 
He opposed to Thomas Hobbes’s opinions about the state of nature, arguing that the 
anarchic state of nature does not demand central authority (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 280). 
Moreover, Locke’s perspective in relation to the social contract is also distinctive. He 
argued that the concept of social contract paves the way for the establishment of domestic 
societies. Constructivists have taken an initiative to implement that analysis on the 
international arena and argued that the relations between states were established in line with 
Locke’s perspective. In other words, constructivists ignore Hobbes’s views about the state 
of nature and, instead, adopt Locke’s counter arguments on the state of nature and prefer to 
put into practice Locke’s understandings in the international arena. 
Max Weber is another precursor of constructivism. Max Weber argued that “We are 
cultural beings endowed with the capacity and will to take a deliberate attitude toward the 
world and to lend it significance” (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 281). Constructivists were 
influenced by Weber’s references to cultural beings and used them in their theories. Hence, 
constructivists attach importance to culture more than realists.  
Immanuel Kant is another precursor of constructivism. His attaching importance to 
subjectivity and relations between subjectivity and knowledge prove to be the roots of the 
constructivist ideology. In this line, constructivists argue that knowledge is something 
subjective bound by people’s thoughts. Elaborating on such an understanding of 
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subjectivity, Alexander Wendt valued the thoughts of people in his article named as 
“Constructing International Politics”. To put it into solid grounds, he argued that “500 
British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean 
nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United States and the North Koreans 
are not” (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). Wendt refers to thoughts and subjectivity of knowledge 
throughout these arguments on an extensive level of research.  
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Deliberations on Constructivism 
 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Structure 
 
 
Constructivists argue that structure is bound by the shared meanings and knowledge 
(Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 284). Material resources are still important but, they do not 
come without meaning and accumulated knowledge. For this reason, Wendt claims 
exorbitantly that the North Korean nuclear power is much more significant than British 
nuclear power and it must definitely be taken into consideration. In other words, material 
resources do not have any sense without attaching meanings or knowledge to them. 
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3.2.2.2 Norms 
 
 
Norms are acknowledged values to specify standards of behavior for actors (Viotti 
& Kauppi, 2012, p. 286). Norms can be local, regional or global. However, the significant 
point in relation to a norm is that when actors accept a specific norm, that norm may well 
lead up to significant changes of interest to those actors. To illustrate, the following 
example is of note: providing development assistances are general results of accepted 
norms more than anything else. In consequence, it is fair to argue that actors shape their 
own circumstances they will act in on the basis of the norms they adopt. 
 
 
 
3.2.2.3 Actors 
 
 
Constructivists do not attach importance to any particular group as actors. Rather, 
constructivists believe that actors may be states, NGOs, individuals, and any special groups 
etc. Further, not any actor can have privileges against other actors in the international area, 
as conceived by the constructivist scholars (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 287). 
All actors share certain roles and are of equal importance on the international arena. 
They have influence on the international structure and their behaviors shape this structure 
through their norms. There is no single actor that has huge influence on the international 
structure, so as to say. 
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3.2.2.4 Identity 
 
 
Identity is another important concept deliberated by the constructivist scholars, who argue 
that there are intersection points between interests and identities. In this frame, 
constructivists have done comprehensive researches on the ways that identities shape the 
relations between the actors of the international arena. An example of this can be the same 
fact that the U.S.A’s perception of threat against Britain is not as same as North Korea. In 
addition, Turkey tried to establish relations between post-Soviet Turkic countries firstly and 
only consequently with other post-Soviet countries. Hence, identity is a major factor in 
international relations theories shaped via the constructivist spurs as one of the key 
concepts. 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Constructivism and Critical Geopolitics 
 
 
As clarified before, the classical geopolitics benefit from the classical realist 
assumptions as a basic departing point. These two domains of international politics 
demonstrate similarities, referring to the same concepts and terms i.e. power, national 
security and state. Constructivism, too, shows similar references with those of critical 
geopolitics. While constructivists argue that the world is always under construction, critical 
geopolitics also recognizes the ongoing process of construction in geopolitical traditions. 
Furthermore, the constructivist ideology mainly focuses on human thoughts or 
consciousness, while critical geopolitics also gives a role to delivering thoughts on certain 
issues through communication channels. Leaders and decision-makers of states construct 
their geopolitical perspectives according to their people’s thoughts or consciousness. To 
further prove the similarity between constructivism and critical geopolitics, it is fair to 
denote that both believe that transnational organizations, international organizations and 
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non-governmental organizations are actors interacting in the international arena. Ideas, 
beliefs or common opinions among people can create NGOs, international organizations 
and transnational organizations such as the Greenpeace, and Doctors without Borders. 
Moreover, collective consciousness may well result in public pressure on leaders to provide 
assistance for donee countries. Hence, it can be purported that states generally provide 
assistance or aids to donee countries as a consequence of demands coming from the 
societies. Turkey, for instance, deconstructed its geopolitical perspective on the Balkans in 
order to be able to provide assistance to Kosovo as a result of collective consciousness and 
extensive demands coming from the Turkish citizens. Lastly, constructivism and critical 
geopolitics both object to the idea of one-sided materialistic materialism. Development 
assistance and aids to countries in need came as a result of rejecting those materialistic 
aspirations by states. In this line, states shall provide development assistance to other states 
in order to contribute to their economic, social and cultural development. 
 
 
 
3.2.4 Critical Geopolitics 
 
 
Critical geopolitics did not emerge as an alternative to the classical geopolitical 
theories. It was a new approach to the world politics. However, it reflects basic similarities 
in its core with the classical geopolitics with regard to the analysis of international relations 
and state actions. Therefore, critical geopolitics did not pose parameters and elements that 
fundamentally differed from those of the classical geopolitical theories.  
Yet, it is still possible to argue that the domain of critical geopolitics proposes a 
different perspective toward geopolitics. The fact that critical geopolitics developed in 
parallel to the constructivist ideology paved the way for a complete rejection of physical 
dominance on seas, airspace or lands. In other words, critical geopolitics does not 
necessarily seek power-based dominance on any geographical location. 
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In addition, critical geopolitics attributes importance to NGOs and international 
institutions such as the Greenpeace, Doctors without Borders (DWB) etc. Institutions like 
these are constructed as a result of common values. To illustrate this fact, DWB argues that 
“all people have the right to medical care regardless of gender, race, religion, creed, or 
political affiliation.” These initiatives came to being thanks to changing the geopolitical 
understanding from classical to critical. The idea that NGOs can be more active and 
efficient in faraway lands in contrast to the states, whose area of influence is rather limited, 
became rather prevalent. With such an initiative, states find the opportunity not to allocate 
budgets on representing themselves in small or insignificant geographical locations. Putting 
this advantage aside, NGOs could reach other states’ territories much easier than state 
agencies. Although NGOs are far more active to reach territories with their aids, the main 
aid providers are still states thanks to their economic power that is generally greater than 
the NGO budgets. States establish specific institutions to provide aids to the recipient 
countries. This type of aids started to become popular at the end of the Cold War. 
Critical geopolitics, as a concept, was first introduced by Yves Lacoste, and then 
developed by John Agnew, Simon Dalby and Gearóid Ó Tuathail. Nevertheless, it cannot 
be said that critical geopolitics completed its development; on the contrary, this ideology is 
still evolving and developing. 
Critical geopolitics can be categorized into four sub-topics that are formal, practical, 
popular and structural geopolitics: 
 
 
 
3.2.4.1 Formal geopolitics 
 
 
As the words of Gray & Sloan, formal geopolitics is deconstructing the geopolitical 
tradition (Gray & Sloan, 2013, p. 110). The main objective of the new formal geopolitics is 
to spatialize the practices of strategic, geopolitical thinkers, academicians and public 
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intellectuals (Tuathail, 1996, p. 46). The scholars work in think-tanks, strategic institutes, 
and thought centers. They have created a compiled system of ideas and principles in order 
to provide guidance in statecraft (Tuathail & Agnew, 2003, p. 81). Another mission of 
formal geopolitics is to justify that practical geopolitics is statecraft (Atkinson & Dodds, 
2003, p. 10). Moreover, formal geopolitics endeavors to contribute in the particular visions 
or perspectives of the world politics (Dodds, 2005, p. 30) formalizing certain strategic 
perspectives of geopolitical institutions (Ciută & Klinke, 2010, p. 327). In comparison to 
classical geopolitics, the formal geopolitics demonstrates two distinguishing features: First 
is that formal geopolitics takes into account various actors rather than a single domineering 
actor in the international arena. These actors are intellectuals, academicians and institutions 
(Ciută & Klinke, 2010, p. 328). Indeed, the state is not at the center of formal geopolitics. 
The second distinguishing feature is that formal geopolitics yields an efficient environment 
for the actors of the system to create ideas or theories together (Haverluk, Beauchemin, & 
Mueller, 2014, p. 20). At later stages, these ideas and theories may become policy 
prescriptions guiding the decision-makers of states. 
 
 
 
3.2.4.2 Practical geopolitics 
 
 
Practical geopolitics is more interested in the geographical politics related with the 
everyday practices of foreign policy. It describes how the geographical perceptions frame 
the conceptualization of foreign policies and decision making processes (Tuathail, 1999, p. 
110). Practical geopolitical approach is specifically significant in reasoning the state foreign 
policies. Geopolitical reasoning takes place when intellectuals or policy-makers within state 
level designate an inner world for themselves and fill or support it with subjects, dilemmas 
and historical memories (Pala & Aras, 2015, p. 288). Practical geopolitical reasoning is 
based on consociation and general suppositions about places and particular identities of 
people belonging to those places. There is a location-based division in this theory, 
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distinguishing places and people into several geographical camps. Discourses by leaders 
and foreign policy-makers are among the strongest methods in catching up with the 
practical geopolitics reasoning (Pala & Aras, 2015, p. 288). Analysis of political leaders’ 
discourses drop hints on their prospective actions. For this reason, practical reasoning is 
also a way to legitimize and justify actions and decisions taken by political leaders. It also 
creates room to maneuver the foreign policies in the eyes of people. For example, the 
geographical features of the Balkan region shaped the U.S. foreign policy during the 
Bosnian crisis. Foreign policy makers from the U.S.A., specifically the US Secretary of 
State James Baker defined the Bosnian War as a nightmare in terms of human rights 
(Tuathail, 2002, p. 602). Geopolitical reasoning under the auspices of the practical 
geopolitical theory helps foreign policy-makers to gain popular support for particular 
foreign policies adopted by their societies (Ouellette & Weiss, 2015, p. 270). One of the 
best examples of practical geopolitics was a speech by the former U.S. President George 
W. Bush. In 2002, the U.S. President George W. Bush defined Iran, Iraq and North Korea 
as an “axis of evil” during the State of the Union Address. Those three states were against 
the U.S. interests politically and ideologically. Despite the fact that no other U.S. 
government established any connection to these three states, the reference as the ‘axis of 
evil’ was the first step to legitimatize the Iraq invasion by the U.S.A. in 2003. Therefore, 
the practical geopolitical approach is closely related with the discourses of foreign policy-
makers within a country, in addition to providing sort of a solid rationale for foreign policy 
conceptualizations. 
 
 
 
3.2.4.3 Popular geopolitics 
 
 
Popular geopolitics also refers to the geographical politics that is created by popular 
culture (Tuathail, 1999, p. 110) i.e. TV series, movies, social media etc. ideas and thoughts 
of popular geopolitics. In that, ideas shaped within the scope of the popular geopolitics 
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have been produced through popular culture (Haverluk, Beauchemin, & Mueller, 2014, p. 
20). Popular geopolitics further refers to various manifestations that are on visual media, 
internet, news, magazines etc. (Dittmer & Dodds, 2008, p. 441). In addition, popular 
geopolitics attempts at constructing images of other places and people (Tuathail, 1999, p. 
111). An exemplary case for popular geopolitics would be the British media and U.K. 
government creating a sense of involvement and empathy for victims of the Bosnian War in 
Europe (Robison, 2004, p. 386). At the same time, there were 1468 news about the war in 
Bosnia in one of the most selling Turkish newspapers Milliyet which is also an example to 
popular geopolitics. Another point of popular geopolitics is that news and media 
approaches create certain rationale for foreign policy makers and governments. 
In today’s globalized world, communication is way easier than the past. Practically 
everyone has access to news everywhere in the world. In addition, social media has become 
one of the most significant tools for people in their daily routines. People can access 
everything they need via their mobile phones. Popular culture is gaining more and more 
importance in people’s daily lives. Consequently, leaders and policy-makers have to make 
use of and follow developments on social media. Moreover, leaders and policy-makers can 
draw polls and learn public opinion quite easily. They can test the pulse of people and 
decide on right policies based on the popular culture. Thereby, popular culture has become 
an important sub-discipline under the geopolitical theories, impacting decisions of political 
leaders or policy makers. 
 
 
 
3.2.4.4 Structural geopolitics 
 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union commenced a brand new era for both world politics 
and states. It caused fundamental changes in state politics and world-views of policy-
makers. However, globalization was another reality leading up to fundamental alterations in 
state policies. Therefore, states now have to design their collective policies in line with the 
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globalization process the world is undergoing and the collapse of the bipolar structure with 
the end of the Cold War after the 1990s. Structural geopolitics studies structural processes 
and inclinations that condition the foreign policy practices states are adopting (Tuathail, 
1999, p. 110). In brief, structural geopolitics is about identifying various variables shaping 
states’ foreign policies. 
The concepts of globalization and information-centered policies were impactful both 
before and during the Cold War. States did not have full control over their foreign policies 
or economies before the war. Nowadays, there is no change in terms of having full range of 
control on their foreign policies or economies. Yet, globalization and information-centered 
policies have led to a proliferation of variables in designing and implementing foreign 
policies. As the new information channels such as the internet enabled easy access to 
information in global scale, designing and implementing solid foreign policies have 
become more difficult than during the Cold War Era. Structural geopolitics focuses on 
these newly developed variables. As distances among states shorten thanks to invention of 
new technologies and improvement in transportation facilities, the structural geopolitics 
also take into account such technological developments in world politics. The reason for 
this is that, the emerging new technologies altered the idea of state security: Under current 
circumstances, states have the capacity to bomb other states from even another continent 
via intercontinental ballistic missiles. Hence, the understanding of security and threat 
perceptions are de-territorialized (Kristjansson & Cela, 2011, pp. 13-14). In other words, 
states perceived threat from other states close to their borders, but now states can perceive 
threats from far away states. 
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Type of Geopolitics Object of 
Investigation 
Problematic Research Example 
Formal Geopolitics Geopolitical thought 
and geopolitical 
tradition 
Intellectuals, 
institutions and their 
political and cultural 
context 
Halford Mackinder, 
his geopolitical 
theories and 
imperialist context 
Practical 
Geopolitics 
The everyday 
practices of 
statecraft 
Practical 
geopolitical 
reasoning in foreign 
policy 
conceptualization 
“Balkanism ” and its 
influence over U.S. 
foreign policy  
towards Bosnia 
Structural 
Geopolitics 
The contemporary 
geopolitical 
tradition 
Global processes, 
tendencies and 
contradictions 
How globalization, 
informationalization 
and risk society 
condition/transform 
geopolitical practices 
Popular Geopolitics Popular culture, 
mass media and 
geographical 
understanding 
National identity and 
the construction of 
images of other 
people and places 
The role of mass 
media in projecting 
images of Bosnia into 
Western livingrooms 
 
Figure 5: Critical Geopolitical Coverage 
(Tuathail, 1999, p. 111) 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
4 SOFT POWER DURING THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
 
 
Power is usually classified in two parts as the hard and soft power. Hard power 
remained as the top priority for states throughout centuries. Defined as the capacity to 
coerce other actors in the international arena, hard power refers to military and economic 
state capacity to obtain national interests. States use hard power, if they perceive any 
problem that would violate their security. In other terms, the higher the perception of 
threats against state security, the higher use of hard power has practically become a rule in 
the international system (Oğuzlu, 2007, p. 81). Due to this fact, the realist theoreticians 
generally interpret the concept of power as a coercive element. More specifically, realist 
scholars do not refer to power without geography and natural resources in relation to 
guaranteeing state security (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p. 139), (Stone, 2005, p. 75). 
Neo-realists, on the other hand, concentrate on the international system rather than the 
capacity to use hard power, as there are many actors in international system and the concept 
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of power is quite relativistic. In other words, power is always relative to the capacities of 
other actors; and one state can always overwhelm another (Waltz, 1979, p. 98). 
According to realism, the best way to ensure national interests is to use hard power, 
which is composed of military and economic power. Actors use these elements of hard 
power in order to force other actors to undertake a cost-benefit calculation (Oğuzlu, 2007, 
p. 83). Most actors in the international system use the carrot and stick policy in order to 
maximize their national benefits. Military capacity can yield ‘good’ for certain states out of 
coercing others that are not relatively less powerful in military terms. Economic capacity 
may also lead up to coercion over less powerful states through implementing economic 
embargoes. Against all these individual ‘good’ outcomes offered by realism for certain 
states in the world, constructivism practically ignores the concept of hard power. Instead, 
constructivist theory makes soft power that is formed by culture, historical background etc. 
The term soft power was first used by Joseph Nye in 1990. He defined soft power as 
exercising state desires via cooperation among states (Nye, 1990). Going deeper in 
analysis, soft power is about affecting and shaping other actors’ desires according to a 
state’s own desires. Nye claims that the collapse of the Soviet Union has led the way for 
reducing the use of military power by states. The increasing number and impact of 
international NGOs and the fact that the effectiveness of military operations and coercion 
has diminished invalidated usage of military power by states. However, the coercive effect 
of military power has not completely disappeared despite the increasing importance of soft 
power. On the other hand, using hard power means economic burden for states, which is 
why soft power started to substitute hard power. Soft power is the ability to get what you 
want through attraction rather than force or coercion. Culture, historical backgrounds, 
economical development and attractiveness, science, literature, art etc. are elements of soft 
power (Kalathıl, 2011, p. 2). Soft power increases with attractiveness of country’s culture, 
policies and political ideals (Nye, 2004, p. 8). However, assuring attractiveness requires 
legitimacy. In other words, attractiveness of culture, policies and political ideals create soft 
power and in turn, legitimitization of state actions increase soft power that states use. 
Thereby, soft power creates attractiveness with different elements in order to affect 
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behaviors and acts of other states. With this definiton and features of soft power in mind, it 
can argued that the concept of soft power is suitable for critical geopolitical perspective.  
Power is one of the important tools for states, decision-makers and foreign policies. 
Significance of power has never changed since the foundation of states. However, the 
nature of power has changed considerably in time. Hard power had been the most 
remarkable instrument for states and decision-makers for a while.  
Throughout history, attempts for imposing hegemony have always led to consecutive 
wars. There were four major attempts to establish hegemony over the world since the 17
th
 
century (Doran, 1971, p. 19). The first attempt was by Habsburg (Spain). It imposed the 
Thirty Years War between the years 1618 and 1648. The Thirty Years War ended with the 
Peace of Westphalia, which paved the way for a new world order. The second attempt was 
conducted by Louis XIV’s France. It was the Wars of Louis XIV and terminated with the 
Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. The third attempt was the one imposed by Napoleon’s France. 
This was a series of wars between the years 1792 and 1815, terminating with the Congress 
of Vienna in 1815. Finally, the last attempt was put into action by Germany with two 
World Wars between 1914 and 1945. The wars resulted in a new world order, where the 
institutional guardian for states has been the United Nations since 1945. The United 
Nations order is still alive (Doran, 1971, pp. 19-20). A balance of power was established 
among the nation-states after the WWII. This state of balance of power is marked by the 
demolition of the bipolar system together with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even if the 
Cold War was not a physical combat, it was an attempt by the two great powers to establish 
world hegemony. Thankfully, their attempted new world order that was to be dominated by 
either Russia or America did not come through with the termination of the Cold War. In 
other words, those major powers’ visionary balance of power did not come to being after 
the Cold War. At the same time, the definition of power has changed in way that it 
encompasses new dimensions rather than the sole military capacity. 
As previously mentioned, power has been the fundamental concept in political 
science and international relations. It can take various forms which are wealth, military 
authority, civil authority and influence on opinions (Russell, 1960, p. 9). The literature of 
political history is full of use of power by states since the Roman Empire (Savoie, 2010, p. 
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3). Military and economic power preserved their importance until the end of the Cold War. 
Due to attaching great importance to the states and their power, NGOs or autonomous state 
organizations could not find any place in the world politics until that time. However, the 
concept of power started to be reformulated after the Cold War. The role and prominence of 
NGOs, regional and international institutions have been appreciated rapidly with the 
changing nature of the world politics and state power. 
As much as hard power, soft power has various sources. These sources can be 
enumerated as culture, collective values and foregin policies (Nye, 2003, p. 13), (Nye, 
2004, p. 8). However, implementing soft power is not just about using these sources 
countries have. Actors must benefit from these relevent sources in their own lands in order 
to use soft power properly in the international arena, as well. Furthermore, non-state actors 
and autonomous state institutions also have an impact on soft power. Hence, NGOs and 
autonomous state organizations can currenty strengthen the soft power that can be utilized 
by states (Bohas, 2006, pp. 410-412). 
Each and every state has its own soft power elements and develops its own strategies 
in order to make use of soft power. The fundamental objective of states is to set influence 
on targeted states so as to obtain interests. To that end, intimate relations must be formed 
among states or the relevant targeted state (Kroenig, McAdam, & Weber, 2010, pp. 414-
415). Moreover, a state should send positive messages to the targeted state it intends to 
establish cooperation with. However, there is negative side of sending positive messages, 
which is that such messages are unique for only the targeted states with which intimate 
relations are to be formed. States generally cannot use the same message to other states. It 
is one of the most distinguishing features of the concept of soft power. Yet, states can offer 
continental projects and messages in order to overcome that problem (Kroenig, McAdam, 
& Weber, 2010, p. 415). 
Although Nye used soft power as a term in 2000s, first implementation and use of 
soft power was during the 15
th
 century. The Ottoman Empire implemented leniency policy 
across the lands it conquered. That leniency policy formed soft power for Ottoman Empire 
in the conquered lands. In addition, France spread its culture and language across Europe, 
trying to use this as an element of soft power. Hitler used films to spread his propaganda 
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during pre- and during the Second World War II. The U.S.A. also used Voice of America 
(VOA) during the Second World War. Then the U.S.A. enhanced the range of its satellites 
in order to reach more people. Al Jazeera can be regarded as another soft power element. It 
is a Qatar-based media network, reaching the entire world, even if Qatar is not deemed as a 
significant actor within the scope of the international relations. 
Usage of soft power is way more difficult than hard power. States generally apply 
hard power - if they have - to get favorable results. However, application of soft power is 
slower than hard power (Nye, 2004, pp. 99-100). 
However, soft power did not emerge suddenly after the Cold War. It was the result of 
two developments in the world politics that spurred before the war. Firstly, realism started 
to lose its popularity in the international relations. During the Cold War, realism took up a 
steady dominance over the international relations and foreign policy perspectives of states. 
Yet, realism became insufficient to explain world politics and facilitate formation of 
foreign policies at later stages of world politics. Roughly, at the same time, constructivism 
started to rise in the international relations and provided better a relatively better 
explanation for all actors in international arena. In addition, critical geopolitics came to 
sight in geopolitics and subrogated classical geopolitics. Hence, constructivism resulted in a 
number of changes in classical geopolitical and critical geopolitical perspectives, which 
were based around the idea of use of power. Although classical geopolitics and realism 
only refer to the concept of hard power, critical geopolitics and constructivism make 
additional reference to soft power. As a result, soft power gained strength as one of rings of 
the chain 
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5 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
 
 
 
Development assistance can be defined as flows of aid to countries and territories on 
the DAC List of ODA Recipients
10
 and to multilateral institutions
11
. Development aid is 
provided to contribute to the development of states by official agencies, including state and 
local governments or their executive agencies. Moreover, development aids should comply 
with the following two principles: 
 The main objective shall be to promote economic development and welfare 
in countries (ODA I. I., 2008, p. 1) 
 The relevant aids shall have concessional character12 and at least 25% of the 
aids must be donation (calculated at a rate of 10 % discount) (ODA I. I., 2008, p. 1) 
                                                          
10 Look figure 8 for list 
11 Look for list of multilateral institutions: 
www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/Copy%20of%20Single%20Table_July%202016_2015%20flows_for%20websit
e.xls 
12 Concessional character means that credit must be given with low level interest rate or no interest rate. 
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However, official development aids have some exceptions. These exceptions are as 
follows: 
 Military aids: Providing military equipment and services cannot be counted 
as development assistance/aid. Moreover, tax exemption for military purposes 
cannot be counted as development aid, as well. However, military power of donor 
countries used for transferring humanitarian aids can be regarded as development 
aids (ODA I. I., 2008, p. 2). 
 Peacekeeping operations: Costs of enforcement of peacekeeping 
operations cannot be counted as development aid. However, UN-approved or UN-
administrated peacekeeping operations and their costs can be counted as 
development aids. Under certain conditions, peacekeeping operations without UN-
approval can be counted as development aids, though. These conditions are defined 
as issues with “human rights, election monitoring, rehabilitation of demobilized 
soldiers and national infrastructure, monitoring and training administrators, customs 
and police officers, advice on economic stabilization, repatriation and 
demobilization of soldiers, weapons disposal and mine removal” (ODA I. I., 2008, 
p. 2). 
 Nuclear Energy: Peaceful construction of nuclear power plants, providing 
nuclear safety and medical use of nuclear power can be counted as development 
assistance. However, military construction and usage of nuclear power cannot be 
counted as development assistance (ODA I. I., 2008, p. 2).  
 Anti-Terrorism: Anti-terrorism operations cannot be counted as 
development assistance. (ODA I. I., 2008, p. 2) 
The principles on development assistance were first specified by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC)
13
 in 1970. As a matter of fact, the concept of development 
aid/assistance was also defined in 1970 by the members of DAC, setting a goal that official 
development aids should amount to 0.7 % of the relevant country’s GNP. That was the first 
                                                          
13 Development Assistance Committee is a part of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)13 by Ministerial Resolution on 23 July 1961 (Führer, 1994, pp. 11-15). It is a unique international organization 
with 29 Members. Moreover, it is the largest organization the members of which are the funders of development aids. The 
World Bank, IMF and UNDP are partners of DAC and they participate in the meetings as observers of the development 
aids provided (DAC H. o., 2016). 
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meeting of DAC members. Following that meeting, states organized many other meetings 
to set new goals and update their agenda with respect to new developments in the world 
politics.  
DECLARATION YEAR CONFERENCE 
NAME/ATTENDEES 
GOAL 
Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) 
Concept 
1969 DAC 0.7% of GNP Target 
Shaping the 21st 
Century: The 
Contribution  of 
Development Co-
operation 
1996 The DAC High Level 
Meeting, OECD 
Ministerial 
and the G7 Summit 
Economic well-being, 
Social development, 
Environmental 
sustainability,  
The Millennium 
Development Goals 
2000 The UN Millennium 
Summit 
A Better 
World for All: Progress 
Towards the 
International 
Development Goals 
Monterrey and OECD 
Action for a Shared 
Development Agenda 
2002 OECD Ministerial 
Council 
OECD Action for 
a Shared Development 
Agenda 
The Rome High Level 
Forum on 
Harmonization 
2003 Members of DAC DAC’s six 
Good Practice Papers 
 
The Paris High Level 
Forum 
2005 The DAC High Level 
Meeting 
increase efforts in 
harmonisation,alignment 
and managing aid 
 
Figure 6: Declarations, Year, Conference Name & Goals of Development Aids 
(DAC T. H., 2006, pp. 7-36) 
DAC classified aid types in eight different segments. These are budget support, pool 
programs and funds, project-type interventions, expertise and other technical assistance, 
scholarships, debt relief, administrative costs and other expenditures (DAC B. A., 2009, pp. 
63-64). 
 Budget Support: Budget support means direct financial support to the 
overall budgets of recipient countries from the donor countries. Administration of 
relevant budgets is shared by the donor and recipient countries (DAC T. o., 2016). 
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 Pool Programs and Funds: Assistance by donor country(ies) is usually 
administrated by different organizations like NGOs, international organizations and 
the private sector. Pool programs are generally multi-dimensional aids provided by 
more than one donor (DAC T. o., 2016). 
 Project-Type Interventions: This includes projects conducted in recipient 
countries. In addition to humanitarian aids, other aids that are channeled by NGOs 
are also counted within project type interventions (DAC T. o., 2016). 
 Expertise and Other Technical Assistance: Donor countries may assign 
experts, consultants, teachers, academicians, researchers and volunteers in order to 
sustain or develop projects. This also includes training and researchers. 
Conferences, seminars and workshops, exchange visits and publications are also 
regarded under this type of aid (DAC T. o., 2016).  
 Scholarships: This covers financial aids from donor countries to overseas 
students. Moreover, imputed cost of tuition in donor countries are also counted 
under this type of aids (DAC T. o., 2016). 
 Debt Relief: This type of aid covers all actions taken to cover relevant debts 
of recipient countries like exemption, conversions, swaps, buy-backs, rescheduling, 
and refinancing (DAC T. o., 2016). 
 Administrative Costs: This covers salaries and expenditures resulting from 
administrative affairs (DAC T. o., 2016). 
 Other Expenditures: This segment covers funding of various activities in 
order to increase public support and awareness in the donee country regarding the 
development and co-operation efforts, as well as needs and issues. Moreover, 
expenditures of refugees, who shelter in donor countries, are also counted within 
this type of aids (DAC T. o., 2016). 
There are main actors of development aids that are NGOs, international institutions, 
international organizations and states. Many times, states organize or encourage NGOs to 
undertake responsibility to deliver development aids to other countries. Moreover, 
international institutions like OECD or UN organize projects and invite other actors to 
partake in these projects. Although NGOs, international organizations and institutions have 
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come into prominence with the collapse of the Soviet Union and rising constructivist 
ideology, states have different motivations to provide development aids. Motivations of 
donor countries can be classified under five categories as follows: political motivations, 
security motivations, humanitarian development motivations, democratization motivations 
and underground sources motivations. 
 Political Motivations: Although development aids are to improve economic 
and social conditions of recipient countries, donor countries do care about political 
relations with recipient countries. Political ties between donor countries and 
recipient countries were researched by Alberto Alesina and David Dollar for the 
first time. Alesina and Dollar did extensive research on the development aids 
provided by certain donor countries between the years 1970 and 1994 (Alesina & 
Dollar, 2000).  
According to the output of this research by Alesina and Dollar, the development 
aids by main donors are as below: 
Bilateral aid to former colonies, 1970 to 1994 
Donor Colony Share Percent 
Australia 55.5 
Belgium 53.7 
France 57.0 
Germany 2.6 
Italy 9.0 
Japan 6.3 
Netherlands 17.1 
New Zealand 22.5 
Portugal 99.6 
Spain 4.8 
United Kingdom 78.0 
United States 2.9 
Figure 7: Bilateral aid to former colonies, 1970 to 1994 
(Alesina & Dollar, 2000, p. 37) 
As can be observed in the chart, the ex-colonial powers have a tendency to convey 
development aids to former colonies. However, this does not explain the motivations of 
donor countries, as development aids do not come only from the ex-colonial powers of the 
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world. Many states, which do not have colonial experience, send development aids to many 
countries. Under these circumstances, it can be assumed that the donor countries choose 
recipient countries in accordance with their interests to expand their area of influence. The 
range of influence comes to mean having authority over a foreign state, area or territory 
(Hast, 2014, pp. 4-5). Although the range of influence has lost its importance following the 
de-colonization period, this aspiration still survives with a different form. States, which 
have kinship or have good relations with other states, are still interested in expanding – or 
at least retaining – their influence with these relevant other states. Therefore, donor states 
usually prefer to provide development aids to states they are sort of interested.  
 Security Motivation: The decolonization process resulted in many 
conflictions, civil wars and the emergence of armed groups largely due to the 
economic and developmental problems in the formerly colonized countries. 
Moreover, starvation and scarcity of foods emerged after the decolonization period 
in many states. Therefore, conflicts, starvation, scarcity of food stocks, economic 
shortages resulted in a problem of security for many states. Terrorist attacks 
resulting from such developmental issues and armed conflicts further affected trade 
relations with the developed countries. For this reason, the developed countries 
decided to provide development aids to the least developed countries in order to 
prevent threats like armed conflicts, terrorism and decreasing in trade volumes. The 
DAC created a Security System Reform to prevent such threats. Core values of the 
Security System Reform are “people-centered and locally-owned democratic norms 
and internationally-accepted human rights principles as well as the rule of law” 
(OECD S.-G. o., 2005, p. 22). According to the Security System Reform, donor 
countries are to provide development aids under the above indicated principles. As a 
result of such aids or assistance, the recipient states shall develop in economic or 
social terms or both, and any possible threats from the recipient countries are also 
prevented in advance by the donors. 
 Humanitarian Development Motivation: Humanitarian development is 
one of the main goals of the United Nations. In that, the United Nations encourages 
states, NGOs and international institutions to provide development aids for 
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humanitarian purposes. The Human Development Index
14
 is the method to measure 
humanitarian developments in the world. The Human Development Index measures 
on the basis of three social dimensions, which are a long and healthy life, being 
knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2016). Development 
aids of donor states shall promote these variables (Veen, 2011, p. 10). 
 Democratization Motivation: Promoting democracy in countries resulted 
in a desire to promote international stability or worldwide economic growth (Veen, 
2011, p. 56). In other words, democracy and rising democratic values resulted in 
economic stability and development. Development aids have direct and indirect 
impacts on the way to promote democracy in relevant recipient countries 
(Bandyopadhyay & Vermann, 2013, p. 333). Indirectly, foreign aids can promote 
democracy with positive transformation of structural conditions of societies. 
Indirectly, development aids can promote democracy with empowering state 
institutions (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, & Seligson, 2007, p. 410). As a matter of fact, 
scholarships, expertise guidance and technical support are among the best ways to 
empower state institutions against conflicts and class struggles in the recipient 
states. In addition, increasing education levels in the recipient countries can further 
democratization processes, as well (Knack, 2004, p. 251). 
 Underground Sources Motivation: In accordance with common sense, 
development aids should automatically decrease, if the recipient states have 
enormous amount of underground sources. However, simple logic is not valid in 
this situation. As purported before, providing expertise and technical assistance are 
among the types of development aids. Donor countries provide more development 
aids to states, which have rich underground sources due to the fact that they would 
benefit from taking out and processing underground sources, which would also 
benefit the least developed countries in economic terms (Collier, 2006, p. 1483).  
                                                          
14
 It is formed by health, education and standard of living. Health is valued by life expectancy. Education is quantified by 
means of years of schooling and expected years of schooling. Standard of living is quantified by gross national income 
per capita (Index, 2015).  
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Figure 8: DAC List of ODA Recipients 
(DAC D. A., 2016) 
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6 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE RULE OF JUSTICE 
AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY 
 
 
 
From the use of atomic bomb in 1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union, there 
was not any single power domineering and putting the world under its hegemony. The 
world was divided into two parts and there were countries not aligning with these two 
major blocks (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 253). Since 1990s, states had been at the center of 
foreign policies. Moreover, international institutions and NGOs were not the primary actors 
in world politics. The end of the Cold War changed all those paradigms. That paradigm 
shift affected foreign policies of nearly all states in the world. Many states changed their 
foreign policy attitudes and tried to increase their spheres of influence. They started to act 
more freely in their foreign policies and world politics after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Thanks to this freedom of action, states were no more members of any sides of the 
previous bipolar world. 
Turkish Foreign Policy did not go through radical changes and transformations of 
after the Collapse of Soviet Union. However, transformation started to take place in 1990s, 
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because Turkey could not adapt itself to the new developments in the world politics. As the 
threat of communism prevailing in Turkey was abolished, Turkey’s geostrategic 
importance decreased rapidly in the eyes of the Western states. Turkey changed its Foreign 
Policy with the Gulf War in order to regain its geostrategic importance in the eyes of the 
Western states. Then, Turkey tried to get benefit from the newly-emerged conflicts. As a 
result, the Turkish policy that was inclined on protecting its status quo has changed (Oran, 
2012, p. 210). İdris Bal divided the Turkish Foreign Policy into three different periods (Bal, 
2010, p. 37). The first Period was the time between the years 1923-1990. In that period, 
structure of the Turkish Foreign Policy was based on protecting the existent status quo. The 
paradigms were strictly formulated and policy-makers never tried to change these 
paradigms. The second period was the 1990-2002 period. During that period, the Turkish 
Foreign Policy was tried to be changed, but habits remaining from the Cold War period still 
continued. The Western states attached geostrategic importance to Turkey due to its 
location and neighborhood with the Soviet Union. However, Turkey lost its geostrategic 
importance together with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet, Turkey continued to act 
presuming that it did not lose geostrategic importance in that second period. The Turkish 
Foreign Policy, during that time, was based on endeavors to regain its geostrategic 
importance. The third period was from 2002 to the present. In this period, Turkey changed 
its policies from passive to proactive rhythmic assumptions (Akgül, 2014, p. 405). 
In the third period, Turkey retreated and was walking on eggshells to be a part of the 
international organizations. To that end, new visions of the Turkish decision-makers 
transformed the Turkish Foreign Policy from static to proactive and dynamic policies 
during the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) ruling (Aras, 2014, p. 405). Thus, the 
newly established Turkish Foreign Policy has new principles and perspectives. Soft power 
and critical geopolitics eventuate as central analytical tools to understand the third period in 
Turkish foreign policies. 
First of all, hard power was the basic instrument for the Turkish Foreign Policy in the 
first two periods. Turkey developed policies around the Western perspectives due to being 
a member of the Western coalition. However, in the third period, hard power lost its 
dominance over soft power. As soft power increasingly became an important tool for 
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Turkish Foreign Policies, new dimensions of soft power such as culture, historical 
backgrounds, economic development and attractiveness, science, literature, art have come 
into prominence for the Turkish policy-makers, as well (Kalathıl, 2011, p. 2).  
 Either hard power or soft power, there is always a need for legitimization for use of 
power in the international relations, as well as domestic politics. However, there is a rule of 
proportionality between the soft power and its legitimization. Due to this fact, Turkey tried 
to establish a balance mechanism between its domestic and foreign policies in order to 
obtain public support from the Turkish citizens for implementation of the Turkish Foreign 
Policy (Aras, 2015, p. 270). 
In the first and second periods, the classical geopolitical perspective could largely 
explain the framework of the Turkish foreign policy. In the first period, geopolitical and 
geostrategic theories were clear for Turkey. However, in the second period a major change 
in this perception became inevitable due to the significant alterations in the direction of the 
world politics. Although there were efforts for changing the political perspective of the 
Turkish foreign policy in the second period, there was no substantive change in the 
geopolitical perspective due to the economic troubles and stability issues the Turkish 
government was undergoing. At the very beginning of the first period, Turkey signed the 
Lausanne Treaty, which was the end of the revisionist perspective adopted previously by 
Turkey. Due to being among the countries defeated in the WWI and invasion of Anatolia, 
Turkey followed revisionist policy to re-gain its independence. Thus, Turkey transformed 
its foreign policy from revisionist to status quoist understanding after signing the Lausanne 
Treaty. At the second half of the first period, Turkey became a member of the Western bloc 
and shaped its foreign policies in accordance with the Western bloc and its leader the 
U.S.A. The collapse of the Soviet Union caused Turkey to lose its geostrategic importance. 
Turkey later tried to regain its geostrategic importance and develop a new geopolitics 
perspective to achieve that goal. However, it could not succeed due to the fact that the 
country was suffering from major economic problems, and the Kurdish issue, as well as the 
altering perception of threat in the world system. The second period started with poor 
economic conditions for Turkey. Turkey’s economic dependence on other countries 
increased dramatically during 1980s. That situation continued during 1990s, as well. 
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Interest payments of internal and external debts of Turkey also increased rapidly during 
1990s. As a matter of fact, Turkey’s interest payments to be made became much higher 
than its tax revenue in 2001 (Oran, 2012, p. 226). Turkey was following a pro-western 
policy since 1950s. In other words, Turkey was an ally for Western countries and thereby, 
there was no threat perceived from the Western bloc against Turkey thanks to this alliance. 
However, Turkey started to perceive threat from the Western Bloc, when draft laws on the 
Armenian issue started to become the top agenda of the Western governments. Under these 
circumstances, the emergence of what is called as Sévres Syndrome15 became unavoidable 
(Oran, 2012, pp. 235-236). The Sévres Syndrome resulted in adoption of security-based 
classical geopolitical understanding by Turkey. Turkey was efficient in establishing balance 
of power between the West and East. That balance provided relative autonomy for Turkey 
in its foreign policies. However, Turkey’s threat perception enlarged from Eastern Bloc to 
all its neighbors. This was the major reason behind the internalization of security-based 
geopolitical perspective. Ultimately, it is essential to utter that the Kurdish Issue remained 
on the agenda until 1999. Turkey developed security-based foreign policies due to the 
Kurdish issue, which contributed in the implementation of classical geopolitical perspective 
in foreign policies, as well. As a result, changing geopolitical perspective and 
implementation of soft power was not a preferential option for Turkey in the second period. 
However, although some of these problems still existed in the third period, the decision-
makers in Turkey decided to change their foreign policy paradigms as well as the 
geopolitical perspectives in the third period. Firstly, Turkey started to implement strict 
fiscal policies in order to balance its budget, as a reaction to the increase in the growth rate 
of Turkey in comparison with the 1990s. Secondly, Turkey assumed candidate status in the 
Helsinki Summit and commenced the negotiation processes in 2005. It provides a space for 
movement for Turkey that gained a sort of self-confidence in the international arena. As a 
result of this acquired self-confidence, Turkey tried to provide assistances to faraway lands 
and establish close relations with the African countries. Thirdly, Turkey tried to change its 
security-based geopolitical understanding as a result of that process of opening up to 
different locations. Establishing relations with many African countries resulted in 
questioning the security-based geopolitical perspectives as Turkey allocated greater focus 
                                                          
15 Sévres Syndrome is a belief that the Western allies and neighbors of Turkey cooperate to divide Turkey. In other words, 
it is an understanding that the Western countries will revive the Sévres Treaty. 
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on security during 1990s, while establishing and promoting relations with different 
countries had a secondary importance. All in all, all causes leading up to the adoption of 
security-based geopolitical perspectives in the Turkish policies were overcome in the third 
period. Hence, Turkey did not hesitate to change its geopolitical perspective from classical 
to critical thanks to the support of soft power during that final period. 
Providing development aid, promoting Turkish culture and language and dealing with 
Turkish diaspora became the newly developed soft power tools for the Turkish Foreign 
Policy. New state institutions namely the TIKA, Yunus Emre Foundation (YEF) and Turks 
Abroad and Related Communities (TARC) are established in order to diversify tools that 
can be used in foreign policy practices (Aras, 2015, p. 270). These institutions provided 
channels for exerting soft power for Turkey. TIKA’s mission is to contribute in alleviating 
poverty and providing sustainable development in partner countries (TIKA M. o., 2016). 
YEF’s mission is to promote the Turkish language, history, culture and art. Moreover, YEF 
provides information and documents about Turkish language, history, culture and art to the 
world. Plus, YEF provides opportunity for people, who want to have education in the fields 
of Turkish language, history, culture and art (YEF, 2016). TARC’s mission, on the other 
hand, is to coordinate and develop activities which target kinships, relative communities 
and students, who receive educatation in Turkey with scholarship (TARC, 2016). The 
Turkish foreign policy is no more one-dimensional and composed only of hard power 
capacity. The afore-mentioned institutions are supportive elements of soft power of Turkey. 
Lastly, it is essential to note that the Turkish Foreign Policy adapted global processes 
after 2002. Millennium Development Goals
16
 have been the main targets for the UN 
members in the first decade of 21
st
 century. Moreover, establishing cooperation with the 
least developed countries and supporting them to be self-sufficient states is another global 
tendency within the 21
st
 century. Under these circumstances, the Turkish Foreign Policy 
adapted itself to global processes, and TIKA has become the most substantial institution for 
providing development aid to the least developed countries to reach Millennium 
Development Goals. 
                                                          
16 There are eight goals to alleviate poverty, hunger and disease. These are to Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty, 
Achieve Universal Primary Education, Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women, Reduce Child Mortality, 
Improve Maternal Health, Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases, Ensure Environmental Sustainability and 
Develop a Global Partnership for Development (Project, 2006). 
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7 THE TURKISH COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AGENCY 
(TIKA) 
 
 
 
TIKA was firstly established as a technical assistance organization in accordance 
with the Statutory Decree Law no. 480 after the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to be 
able to respond to the Turkic states’ needs for restructuring, adaptation and development. 
TIKA became legally and officially active after the publication of the Council of Ministers’ 
decision in the Official Gazette edition no. 21124 dated January 27, 1992 (TIKA, 1992, pp. 
1-6). TIKA was reorganized in 1999 and started to function under the Prime Ministry of the 
Republic of Turkey with the adoption of “the Law on the Organization and Tasks of the 
Turkish Cooperation and Development Administration Directorate” no. 4668. It entered 
into force after the publication of Official Gazette edition no. 24400 dated May 12, 2001 
(TIKA, 2001). 
TIKA, once again, reorganized its frame in 2002 and became one of the most 
important means in the implementation of Turkish Foreign Policies. Increasing number of 
its activities and reorganization of TIKA were the first steps taken for diversification and 
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transformation of the pro-status quo structure of the Turkish Foreign Policy. TIKA’s 
activities and projects influenced many Turkish NGOs. These NGOs started to receive 
support from TIKA in time. Moreover, the Turkish decision-makers aimed to allocate 0.7% 
of the gross national income (GNI) to the development aid. Thus, Turkey has increased its 
rate of its development aids from 0.11
17
% to 0.54 %
18
 since 2004, exceeding the DAC 
averages (0.3 % of GNI) in 2012. 
Under these conditions, TIKA also changed its administrative and organizational 
structure in order to be more efficient and to provide more development aids to different 
countries. In its first organizational scheme, there were two vice presidents and 18 program 
coordination offices. Furthermore, departments
19
 and coordination offices were connected 
to President directly in that scheme.  
 
Figure 9: Organizational Scheme of TIKA in 2005 
(TIKA, 2006) 
                                                          
17 0.11 % of GNI was 2004 data. 
18 0.54 % of GNI was 2015 data. 
19 The only exception was the department of education, cultural and social affairs. That department and its sub-
departments were connected to the Vice President. 
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However, the organizational scheme of TIKA and its administrative structure were 
reorganized in 2011 in order to be more efficient and reach different geographies more 
easily. According to its new organizational structure, there are 3 vice presidents in TIKA. 
Two of these vice presidents are responsible for the regional departments, while the other 
vice-president is responsible for the department of human resources and other supporting 
services, as well as the department of external relations and partnerships. After a year, the 
organizational scheme was changed again and took its final form. The only change in this 
final version is that the human resources and supporting services were removed from the 
responsibility of the vice-president. This final form has been preserved until 2016. 
TIKA also improved its organizational structure and enlarged its activity of field 
between 2011 and 2016. In 2005, all regions were under the responsibility of the Vice 
President, while the development of projects was under the responsibility of another Vice 
President. However, that previous organizational structure remained inefficient for TIKA 
especially after 2006 due to the increasing number of its activeness. In 2016, every region 
and projects related to these regions were put under the responsibility of the Vice 
Presidents of TIKA collectively to continue activities regularly. In other words, TIKA 
increased the number of its experts and diversified its organizational structure in order to 
reach faraway lands and enlarge its field of activity. 
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Figure 10: Organizational Scheme of TIKA in 2016 
(Umut & Yıldız, 2015, p. 13) 
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7.1 Projects by TIKA 
 
 
2003 was the year of crisis for the Turkish Foreign Policy because of the Iraqi War. 
Decision-makers authorized within the scope of the Turkish Foreign Policy diverted all 
their attention to the Middle East and Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the rejection of the 1
st
 March 
Resolution 
20
 in the Turkish Grand National Assembly also led to crisis in the relations 
between the U.S.A. and Turkey. Yet, the year 2003 was also the time for restoring the 
U.S.A.-Turkey relations. 
Decision-makers in Turkey accelerated the process of diversification of Turkish 
Foreign Policies after the year 2004. At the same time, TIKA came to the center of this 
process of diversifying Turkish Foreign Policies, being was also the pioneering and 
exemplary institution for other organizations such as Yunus Emre Foundation (YEF) and 
Turks Abroad and Related Communities (TARC). TIKA has become the flagship of 
development aids of Turkey since 2002. TIKA’s activities can be divided into three major 
periods, taking into account the transformation of geopolitical perspective, and its impact 
on Turkish foreign policy parameters. 
Turkish development assistance is classified in two groups. There are Official Flows 
and Private Flows of development assistance. Official Flow is further divided into two 
groups as Official Development Assistance and Other Official Flows. Official Development 
Assistances is also divided into other two groups as Dual-Sided Official Development 
Assistance and Multi-Sided Official Development Assistance. Likewise, the Private Flow 
segment of Turkish development assistance programs is also divided into two groups as the 
Private Sector Flows and NGOs Flows. 
As such, having various groups of development assistance is significant in 
determining the driving forces and basic components of development. Turkey’s 
classification of such aids – as listed above – is important so as to understand the basis and 
                                                          
20 1st March 2003 resolution is that Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) refused to send nearly 60000 Turkish 
soldiers to Iraq and the deployment of 62000 U.S. soldiers in Turkey (Gözen, 2005, p. 74).  
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sources of development assistances. Under that classification, it is easy to define the 
responsible authorities that provide development assistances or aids.  
 
Scheme of Turkey’s Development Assistances 
©Hakan Sezgin Erkan 
Figure 11: Scheme of Turkey’s Development Assistances 
(Gür, Kaygusuz, Aydın, & Akınbingöl, 2012a, p. 16) 
 Official Flows: These types of aids were provided by donor countries’ 
“official agencies, including state and local governments or their executive 
agencies” (ODA I. I., 2008, p. 1). 25% of such institutions’ revenues may be 
granted for donation. This group was further divided into two sub-groups (Gür, et 
al., 2008, p. 10). 
o Official Development Assistance: Official Development Assistance 
is provided by donor countries’ “official agencies, including state and local 
governments or their executive agencies” (ODA I. I., 2008, p. 1). This group 
of assistance aims to encourage economic development and welfare in the 
Turkey's Development 
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Official Flow 
Official Development 
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least developed or developing countries. These types of aids can be 
exemplified as the direct donations without any compensation or the long-
term loans with low interest rates with a condition that 25% of such loans 
must be donated money. Official Development Assistance is channeled 
directly or through international organizations working in the recipient 
countries to the governmental apparatuses of recipient countries. (Çankaya, 
et al., 2004, p. 19) 
 Dual-Sided Official Development Assistance: This means 
aid or assistance flowing between the donor and recipient countries. 
It includes budget support, financial support for NGOs and private 
sector, project-program assistance, technical cooperation, emergency 
aid, domestic student assistance, acquitted debt, administrative 
spending, development assistance promotion efforts and benefits for 
refugees (Çankaya, et al., 2004, p. 21). 
 Multi-Sided Official Development Assistance: This group 
of aids is composed of benefits to international organizations, local, 
regional or international institutions that aim to grant economic 
development for the least developed countries or developing 
countries (Çankaya, et al., 2004, p. 19). 
o Other Official Flows: These types of aid-flows also aim to 
encourage economic development and welfare in the least developed or 
developing countries. However, the rates of donations to this type of aid are 
less than 25%. Loans that are not for encouraging economic development 
and promoting welfare, are also included in the group of other official flows 
*i.e. commercial loans, investment credits, agricultural loan etc. (OECD, 
Other Official Flows, 2016). 
 Private Flows: As the definition of DAC proposes, private flows are 
financial aids that are transacted in the markets through private industry’s resources 
and grants (OECD, Private flows, 2016).  
Development assistance provided by Turkey TIKA may be classified in two main and 
seven sub-groups.  
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Figure 12: Types of Official Development Assistance Provided by Turkey 
The first type is the Project Program Assistances (PPA) that aims to enhance the rate 
of real capitals in the donee countries. The second type is the Technical Collaboration (TC). 
TC includes all activities and projects, which aim to increase the technical and productivity 
capabilities
21
 of countries (Gür, Kaygusuz, Aydın, & Akınbingöl, 2012, p. 25). TC and 
PPA are equipment and supplies aids, publicity or promotional programs, expertise, and 
education programs (Atmaca, 2004, pp. 37-38). Equipment and Supplies are direct aids. 
Donee countries can directly apply to TIKA for this type of assistance. Such assistance can 
be described as food, clothes, medicine aids, etc. Promotional programs are arranged by 
TIKA in order to publicize and promote Turkey. TIKA publishes many brochures, journals, 
                                                          
21 TC are equipment and supplies, publicity/promotional programs, expertise, and education programs (Atmaca, 2004, pp. 
37-38) 
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annuals and special journals to publicize the image of Turkey. Moreover, TIKA organizes 
numerous meetings and conference in foreign countries. Providing expertise is offering 
expert assistance to donee countries in various fields of life. TIKA works with other 
institutions within Turkey to deliver expertise for areas that other countries are not 
sufficiently knowledgeable. When a donee country announces a request from TIKA, 
expert(s) of various institutions in Turkey can be sent to that country under TIKA’s 
coordination. Education programs indicate periodical education opportunities provided to 
the donee countries. Topics or the main fields of education may change according to the 
demand of the donee countries. Yet, the procedure for providing such educational 
assistance is the same with the expertise assistance. After receiving a request from a 
prospective donor country, TIKA organizes and coordinates programs and may well receive 
support from other institutions in Turkey to facilitate education programs in the donee 
countries (Atmaca, 2004, pp. 37-39). 
Implementation of projects is a difficult process for foreign countries, as the process 
of carrying out projects and acting according to the newly-emerging situations in foreign 
territory requires solid coordination. Due to this reason, TIKA opened Program 
Coordination Offices in many countries to overcome this challenge. Coordination Offices 
provide coordination and communication between Turkey & the donee countries, monitor 
TIKA’s projects and follow new developments in the relevant countries so as to be able to 
inform the Turkish authorities. Hence, the Coordination Offices are essential parts of TIKA 
and its projects. TIKA currently has 42 Program Coordination Offices as of 2016 (TIKA D. 
o., 2016, pp. 11-13). 19 of these 42 Program Coordination Offices were opened after 2006, 
which is the third and most active period of TIKA. 
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Figure 13: Program Coordination Offices of TIKA 
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There are 3 main periods describing the developmental process of TIKA
22
. The first period 
was between 1992 and 2002. Turkish economy during that time was not strong enough to offer 
development aids to foreign countries
23
. Moreover, Turkey did not have a solid and robust 
technical infrastructure to provide technical assistance to other countries. Even if Turkey did not 
possess sufficient economic power and technical infrastructure by that time, TIKA managed to 
conduct 256 projects yearly between 1992 and 2002. In total, 2346 projects were implemented in 
its first period (Kardaş & Erdağ, 2012, p. 171). In this period, most of the aids were provided to 
the Turkic countries. 
The second period was between the years 2003 and 2005. TIKA became more and more 
active especially after 2003 in parallel with Turkey’s increasing economic power and 
strengthening technical infrastructure. The number of its offices and projects increased 
tremendously after 2003 on annual basis (Kardaş & Erdağ, 2012, p. 171). In 2004, TIKA had 14 
Program Coordination Offices in foreign countries. Main settlements of TIKA were in post-
Soviet Turkic countries. Yet, TIKA also increased its number of offices and expand its activities 
in the Balkans and African countries. In that period, TIKA generally focused on alterations of 
schools, educating citizens of demanding countries, providing equipment, offering assistance in 
agriculture and industrial technics, as well as increasing the level of cultural cooperation. The 
most attractive component of the first period was the agricultural technical assistance provided to 
recipient countries, as these countries started to be self-sufficient in a decade. In addition, TIKA 
provided technical support and equipment to hospitals in its second period. Another important 
activity of TIKA in this second period was the restoration of historical artifacts. TIKA restored 
the historical Mostar & Konjic bridges and historical mosques in Bosnia (TIKA, 2006, pp. 121-
123). Although TIKA became more active during that period, the third period marks more 
operations and actions taken by TIKA in numerical terms. 
The third period is between 2006 and 2016. In 2006, TIKA implemented 1452 projects and 
activities overall (Kardaş & Erdağ, 2012, p. 171). In 2005, the number of activities and projects 
was 562 (TIKA, 2006, p. IV). The dramatic increase in the number of projects marks the 
beginning of the third and most active period in TIKA’s brief history. The number of TIKA’s 
                                                          
22 These periods are determined on the basis of the number of projects conducted by TIKA so far. 
23 The outstanding external debt increased 2.3 times between 1991 and 2001. The rate of external debt/gross national product 
started with 33.19% and reached 77.73% in 2001. High acceptable rate is 60% with respect to economic norms (Oran, 2012, pp. 
214-215). Moreover, there were three economic crises in Turkey between 1991 and 2002. 
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projects and official and private flows to the least developed countries increased year by year 
following the year 2006. In four years, TIKA increased its numbers of projects to 1673. The 
amount of aids nearly increased six times from 2006 to 2010. An example for this is the fact that 
TIKA donated 10 million U.S. Dollars to 34 African countries in 2010 (Gür, et al., 2011, p. 10). 
In two years, TIKA increased the number of its projects again from 1673 to 1879. In other 
words, increasing official development aids provided by Turkey went in parallel with the TIKA’s 
projects and general aids in its third period. 2012 was the year when 1879 projects and activities 
in total were implemented by TIKA. Further, Turkey went beyond the average ration of aids 
defined by the DAC with its foreign aids that are calculated on the basis of the percentage of the 
gross national income in 2012. Then, the gap between DAC’s average and Turkish aids increased 
on annual basis thanks to the activeness of TIKA, as well as its grants during the Syrian refugee 
crisis. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
 
 
8 ROLE OF TIKA AS A MAIN PROVIDER OF DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE FOR TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
TIKA was not an institution present during the Cold War Era. An equivalent organization 
in the U.S.A., the USAID, was established in 1961 (Senate, 2003, pp. 15-19). The United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) for U.S.A, Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA) for Sweden, State Council & Eximbank for China, Directorate-
General for International Cooperation (DGIS) for Netherland, Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD) for France, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale (GIZ) for Germany, 
Department for International Development (DFID) for United Kingdom, Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAid) for Australia, Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) for Japan, and the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) for South Korea 
are organizations equivalent to TIKA. These institutions were established between the years 
1960s and 1990s. All of these organizations provided aids during the Cold War era for the 
benefit of the Western bloc. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the emergence 
of new independent states. Hence, these institutions changed their scopes from aid to 
75 
 
development aid in order to be able to provide economic development benefits for these new 
nation states.  
The Turkish economy started to grow and gain momentum after 2002 and later, Turkey 
became one of the important donor countries in time. TIKA changed its structure in time and 
reorganized itself on the basis of the intersection of critical geopolitics and soft power. To put it 
another way, TIKA has now two theoretical roots, which are critical geopolitics and soft power.  
The major changes in the direction of Turkish foreign policy started with a shift in the 
Turkish diplomacy what was based on protecting status quo. Before, during, and after the Iraq 
War, Turkey took initiatives and followed directions of what is called as the dynamic diplomacy. 
That dynamic diplomacy was put into practice when the Cyprus issue took place in 2008, as well 
as the Armenia issue that broke out in 2009. Turkey started to take initiative as a mediator in 
international conflicts. These changes have brought along the deconstruction of geopolitical 
tradition and perspective in Turkish political practices. Turkey no more limits itself to its 
tangible borders and opens many embassies in foreign countries. Moreover, the Turkish Airlines 
increased its number of flights to many countries. The deconstruction and relinquishing of the 
geopolitical tradition has brought along a process of diversification for the Turkish Foreign 
Policy practices. Supportive institutions within the body of the Turkish Foreign Policy were 
established including the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Yunus Emre 
Foundation (YEF) and Turks Abroad and Related Communities (TARC). What is more, creating 
diversification in the Turkish Foreign Policy practices has brought structural changes in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well. The Law 6004 on the Foundation and Duties of the ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA, 2010) was adopted for conducting structural changes in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The law aims to accelerate the promotion of consular diplomats and career 
diplomats, who are skillful and self-developed. Thereby, the number of diplomats has increased 
systematically since 2000 (Aras, 2015, p. 274). As of 9
th
 June 2016, there have been 2217 
diplomats, who work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (MFA, 2016). However, this 
number is not enough, when we compare it to the one that is present in more effective and 
influential countries in the world. For instance, nearly 14000 diplomats work for the U.S.A, 
whereas 6000 diplomats work for Germany and France (Aras, 2015, p. 274). 
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The diversification process that the Turkish Foreign Policy is undergoing resulted in 
abandoning the classical geopolitical assumptions. Critical geopolitics started to be implemented 
within the scope of the newly-established Turkish Foreign Policy, which also serves as the origin 
of TIKA. Moreover, additional supportive institutions are also designed on the basis of the 
assumptions of the critical geopolitical theories. 
TIKA is the flagship of supportive institutions, which facilitate the diversification of the 
Turkish Foreign Policy. In this line, TIKA restructured its organizational scheme in 2001. It 
became more active in 2003 under the presidency of Hakan Fidan. TIKA published Turkish 
Development Assistances Reports (TIKA, 2016) and TIKA Annual Reports (TIKA, 2016a) on 
annual basis after 2003, a fact that proves its extensive range of TIKA’s activities.  
Before starting the discussion on the bases of TIKA, literature review about TIKA is useful 
to clarify main contribution of this dissertation. There are many significant studies about TIKA 
in the literature. TIKA is studied by many writers and they contributed to the literature on TIKA. 
Firstly, Özkan and Demirtepe’s article (Özkan & Demirtepe, 2012) about TIKA is one of the 
important articles that cover the transformation process TIKA has undergone as a result of the 
internal and external political changes. Moreover, they argue in the article that the change in the 
scope of TIKA from Turkic countries to other countries was experienced. They explain that 
change via the relative political stability in Turkey and the multidimensional foreign policies 
adopted by Turkish policy-makers (Özkan & Demirtepe, 2012, pp. 648-649). Hence, they 
establish a direct relation between the stability of Turkey and the activeness of TIKA. Secondly, 
Korkmaz, Yücel and Aytaç’s (Korkmaz, Yücel, & Aytaç, 2014) article is another article about 
TIKA, where the writers analyze the amount of TIKA’s development aids and conclude that 
TIKA’s development aids had been in a rising trend between the years 2005-2012. Thirdly, 
Kardaş and Erdağ’s article (Kardaş & Erdağ, 2012) is one of the inspirational articles about 
TIKA. In that article writers analyze Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy in detail and 
focus on TIKA as one of the implementer of Turkish Foreign Policy. They conclude that the 
Turkish Foreign Policy is shaped by the constructivist perspectives. The writers argue that 
TIKA’s projects give a hand to the developing countries in their developmental struggles. 
Moreover, writers also reach the idea that TIKA’s activeness is the result of an economic and 
political relative stability in Turkey (Kardaş & Erdağ, 2012, pp. 187-190). Fourthly, 
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Kulaklıkaya’s article (Kulaklıkaya, 2008) is another contribution to literature that is based on the 
analysis that TIKA’s projects and development assistances demonstrate parallelism with those of 
the UN in terms of aims and international trends (Kulaklıkaya, 2008, pp. 28-29). Fifthly, Fidan 
and Nurdan’s article (Fidan & Nurdan, 2008) features a thorough analysis on the changing trends 
countries have been internalizing for assuring development assistances to other countries, as well 
as the significance of the concept and practice of coordination among international  aid agencies 
(Fidan & Nurdan, 2008, pp. 93-94). Çomak, in his article (Çomak, 2011), contributes to the 
literature on development aids by purporting the idea that Turkey has deep interest in Africa 
(Çomak, 2011, pp. 205-206) and TIKA guarantees support by the Turkish NGOs to the African 
continent (Çomak, 2011, pp. 214-217). Karagül’s article (Karagül, 2013) is one that is allocated 
for examining the effects of projects facilitated by TIKA on the Balkan countries (Karagül, 2013, 
pp. 92-98). Çavuş’s article (Çavuş, 2012) covers the concept of soft power utilized by Turkey. 
Moreover, Çavuş supports the argument that Turkey’s soft power is increasing in association 
with TIKA’s incrementing activity in the international field through its aids (Çavuş, 2012, pp. 
33-34). Purtaş, another Turkish scholar, points out in the article published to (Purtaş, 2013) the 
cultural aspects of soft power and argues that TIKA is one of the implementer of cultural 
diplomacy of Turkey (Purtaş, 2013, p. 7). Finally, İpek’s article (İpek, 2015) is one of the most 
significant articles in the literature in relation to TIKA. İpek analyzes the construction proces of 
Turkey’s soft power through TIKA within the scope of its vast number of projects (İpek, 2015, 
pp. 179-188). These articles have different approaches about TIKA and its activities. However, 
none of them use critical geopolitics and constructivism together to explain TIKA, its activities 
and changing paradigms  
TIKA is primarily originating from the critical geopolitical assumptions, as clarified 
before. Within this framework, TIKA shaped its policies and structure under the influence of 
formal geopolitics and structural geopolitics. Under the roof of formal geopolitics, various 
Turkish strategists, intellectuals and decision-makers operating for the Turkish Foreign Policy 
are spatializing development spaces in the least-developed countries in accordance with new 
parameters ruling the Turkish Foreign Policies. These experts have deconstructed and 
relinquished the geopolitical tradition in adoption of certain policies in the international field. 
TIKA has taken initiatives and adopted active roles to facilitate development and the 
deconstruction of geopolitical tradition in Turkish politics. The main approach in the Turkish 
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Foreign Policy had been staying out and not interfering in problems of foreign countries. 
However, that approach changed after 2003 and Turkey start to take initiatives in an attempt to 
solve the problems of foreign countries. Decision-makers authorized with the implementation of 
the Turkish Foreign Policy worked on the Balkans, Africa, Middle East and Central Asia as areas 
of development, where Turkey can increase its influence. Then, TIKA developed and run many 
projects in these geographies. Development aids have been channeled mostly to the countries, 
which are located in the continents that Turkey is interested as a result of the implementation of 
formal geopolitics as the new Turkish Foreign Policy. 
In terms of structural geopolitics, Turkey has started to follow the global tendencies, 
processes and contradictions. Development aids have been among the main global tendencies for 
developed countries since 1969. However, the Millennium Development Goals reached at the top 
of the global tendencies. Many developed and developing countries have set goals to convey aids 
corresponding to 0.7% of their Gross National Product. Many states have adapted themselves to 
the new global tendencies, as the issue development aids and assistance has become one of the 
prominent compounds of foreign policies. Furthermore, addressing to the problems of countries 
in faraway geographies is much easier than the past thanks to the increasing level of knowledge 
in societies and growing economies. Therefore, the information age also frames the elements of 
foreign policies of states. What is more, getting knowledge from faraway geographies also 
attracts attention of states and they have started to design their policies with respect to the 
knowledge they acquire. Turkey is also an implementer of structural geopolitics in its foreign 
policies. TIKA has adopted global tendencies as much as its equivalents like the USAID, SIDA, 
DEGIS and GIZ. According to these global tendencies, TIKA has developed many projects and 
delivered development aids to the least-developed geographies. As a result of adopting 
development aids as a national strategy, Turkey’s development aids have demonstrated a regular 
increase since 2004. The only decrease in the rate of development aids provided by Turkey 
happened in 2007, but that was the result of the changing calculation methods for the Gross 
National Income by the Turkish Statistical Institute. 
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 Data based on (million) U.S. Dollar 
 Amount of aids between 2002, 2003 and 2004 based on exchange rate of 2004 
 After 2011, NGOs aid counted in Private Flow 
(Gür, et al., 2015) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total 
Developme
nt 
Assistance 
144,7
6 
133,4
7 
1.128,2
3 
1.051.9
4 
1.709.
4 
1.336,6
4 
1576,7
5 
1.519.6
5 
1.718.1
8 
2.363,4
5 
3.436,4
8 
4,347,1
4 
6.403,1
3 
1. Official 
Flow 
72,97 66,63 339,15 601,04 714,2
1 
602,24 780,36 707,17 967,42 1.284,7
3 
2.589,3
0 
3,307,6
7 
3.591,1 
1.2. Other 
Official 
Flow 
(OOF) 
71,79 66,84 789,08 394,2 -77,53 -41,6 -2,55 -11,01 -25,23 11,72 56,53 -13,36 72,49 
2. Private 
Flow 
No 
data 
No 
data 
No 
data 
No 
data 
994,4
7 
730,33 726,62 714,49 670,31 1.078,7
2 
846,65 820 2.412 
2.1 NGOs 
Aid 
No 
data 
No 
data 
No 
data 
56,7 78,25 45,66 72,32 109 105,68 - 111,65 232,53 327,56 
Figure 14: Development Aids Provided Turkey between 2002-2014 
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The second source of TIKA is soft power. Turkey generally acted as an implementer and 
user of classical geopolitical theories and hard power until 2000. During the Cold War era, 
Turkey designed its policies in line with the Western Bloc. However, Turkey continued to center 
its foreign policies on hard power during 1990s, even if the Cold War ended. Relying too much 
on hard power resulted in a major decrease in soft power usage by Turkey during 1990s. It also 
prevented soft power from becoming the core element of foreign policy. Although Ismail Cem, 
who was a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, tried to transform the Turkish foreign policy 
between 1997 and 2002, he could not be successful due to the economic weaknesses and 
problems in Turkey. Turkey has started to increase its economic power since 2002, though. 
Increasing economic power also resulted in increasing soft power of Turkey. Reaching field of 
Turkish Satellites, the number of TV & radio channels, foreign aids, activeness and number of 
NGOs, flight routes of Turkish Airlines have also increased dramatically. The Turkish 
Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) is the pioneer organization, which is one of the 
means to implement soft power by Turkey. TIKA has taken an active role in the implementation 
of soft power since 2001 with most recent legal regulation (TIKA, 2001). Although Turkey 
started to provide development aids during 1980s under the auspices of the State Planning 
Organization, TIKA has taken over a portfolio from the State Planning Organization in order to 
deliver development aids. Due to successful and planned organizational structure and projects, 
development aids provided by Turkey with the hand of TIKA have taken place among the most 
important tools for use of soft power. Thereby, TIKA has become a major driving force for 
Turkey to embellish itself with soft power. 
2002 was a cornerstone for Turkey and TIKA to provide development assistances to 
recipient countries. Turkey, in that year, recognized development aid as an element of soft 
power. Moreover, Turkey aspired to develop these recipient countries in order to provide 
security for both themselves and the international regime. Therewithal, increasing economic 
development in the least developed countries provided new trade partners for Turkey. For this 
reason, Turkey attributes significance to the development aids. TIKA have been the basic 
development aid provider from within Turkey. Although there are many other foundations and 
institutions providing development aids from within Turkey, TIKA can be regarded to be well 
ahead.  
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As a result, TIKA was highly effective in changing the paradigms of the Turkish foreign 
policy. In the wake of enhancing Turkey’s soft power, TIKA has gained a remarkable position 
for Turkey. Therewithal, the classical geopolitical theories dwindled down their importance in 
the international relations and foreign policies. The critical geopolitical perspective also affected 
Turkey and TIKA, in turn, can be deemed as a reflection of that effect. Ultimately, Turkey has 
complied with the international trends on development aids, which compose an intersection point 
for nearly all developed countries in the world. Turkey managed to adopt that trend and 
outdistanced the average number of the Development Assistance Committee members in 
providing development assistance in 2012. According to 2015 data, Turkey provided 0.54% of 
its gross national income as development assistance to other countries. Turkey has increased its 
ratio more than three times since 2011. 
 
Figure 15: Net Official Development Aids Provided by Turkey 
 Data based on % of Gross National Income 
 Red line is Turkey, black line is average of DAC countries 
(OECD, Net Official Development Aids Data, 2015) 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
 
 
9 HOW DOES TIKA DETERMINE DONEE COUNTRIES? 
 
 
 
TIKA was established in order to provide development assistance for the Turkic countries 
that were former members of the Soviet Union. Turkey has always tried to provide aids to these 
Turkic republics as its foundational objective. As a result, nearly half of the development aids is 
sent to Caucasus and Asia. Turkey reserves half of its budget to these countries. What is more, 
Turkish experts developed projects with respect to the needs of Turkic countries. It is easy to see 
that half of Turkey’s projects have been realized in Caucasus and Asia. It means that the main 
target area for Turkey has been Caucasus and Asia since 2009.  
TIKA has generally focused on the development of social infrastructure in donee countries. 
The development of social infrastructure contains education, health, water, and shelter, etc. 
Therefore, TIKA is considered to primarily focus on providing minimum requirements with 
respect to life conditions of citizens in the donee countries. The development of economic 
infrastructure has come as a second issue. This economic support contains transportation and 
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storage, communication, energy and banking & finance. However, when we compare the 
development of social infrastructure and other types of aids by TIKA, it becomes obvious that 
aids for the development of social infrastructure have absolute dominance over other types of 
aids. 
 Caucasus and 
Asia 
Africa Middle East Balkans and 
East Europe 
Other 
2005
24
 55.5% 8% 35.10% 8% 
2006
25
 50% 10.30% 38% 1.70% 
2007 56.63% 12.87% 26.83% 3.67% 
2008 53.89% 10.96% 4.47% 24.58% 6.09% 
2009 44.44% 24.68% 26.85% 4.03% 
2010 36.65% 8.71% 22.92% 29.79% 1.93% 
2011 49.70% 16.80% 15.50% 12.90% 5.10% 
2012 29.17% 31.37% 15.48% 22.81% 1.17% 
2013 21.83% 33.70% 21.74% 21.40% 1.33% 
2014 28.60% 23.86% 21.10% 21.25% 5.19% 
2015 No Data 
Figure 16: Budgets Allocated by TIKA for Development Assistance (Continent by 
continent) 
*2005 and 2006 was not base on share of budget. It based on percentage of numbers of 
projects. 
**After 2007 data based on rate of share of budget 
(Gür, et al., 2015) 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 2005 data was not base on share of budget. It based on percentage of numbers of projects. 
25
 2006 data was not base on share of budget. It based on percentage of numbers of projects 
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9.1 Geographical Distribution of TIKA’s Development Assistance 
 
 
In 2005, development aids by Turkey focused largely on the development of social 
infrastructure. 312 out of 562 projects were actualized to increase the level of development in 
social infrastructures (TIKA, 2006, p. 7). In other words, the main target of development aids 
provided by Turkey was to develop the social infrastructures in the donee countries during that 
year. Therefore, the growth of the Turkish economy was around 8.4% (Karagöl, 2013, p. 27) and 
Turkey shared its economic development mostly with the Turkic countries, endeavoring to 
develop their social infrastructures. 2005 was declared as “the Year of Africa” (TIKA, 2006, p. 
V). As a result of that declaration, TIKA followed similar foreign policies, opening two Program 
Coordination Offices in Africa. 
In 2006, 727 out of 1452 projects were realized in Asia (Çankaya, et al., 2007, p. 21). Asia, 
the Balkans and Caucasus were the main target of TIKA. From this perspective, TIKA started to 
develop new projects for the Middle Eastern and Sub-Saharan African states as a consequence of 
adopting multi-dimensional understanding of foreign policy. Thus, the share of budget allocated 
for the African and Middle Eastern countries increased in 2006 rather than 2005. In that year, 
752 projects were developed by TIKA in order to develop the social infrastructures of donee 
countries (Çankaya, et al., 2007, p. 23). The development of economic infrastructure had the 
second place with 347 projects. 
In 2007, TIKA changed its method and declared use of budget shares instead of the 
number of projects in foreign development assistance. TIKA reserved 78% of its budget for 
development of social infrastructures in 2007 (Gür, et al., 2008, p. 8). The institution also opened 
two new Program Coordination Offices in Montenegro and Senegal. In 2007, the rate of the 
development aids increased 7.2%, which is higher than 2006 as a result of the acceleration 
process of reconstructing Afghanistan. Turkic countries were still at the top of the list for budget 
shares in 2007. During that year, Afghanistan was at the top of the list of donee countries, which 
were provided with development assistance by TIKA, due to the ongoing reconstruction program 
in Afghanistan. Hence, TIKA is also pragmatic and can adapt its plans to the changing 
conditions of the world conjuncture. 
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The development of social infrastructure was still at the top of the list in 2008. 79.53% of 
the budget was reserved for social aids (Gür, et al., 2009, p. 13). Moreover, Turkey reserved 
44.56% of its development aids budget for Afghanistan, due to the aforementioned 
reconstruction program (Gür, et al., 2009, p. 12). TIKA also developed projects in parallel with 
the Turkish Foreign Policy. As essential part of African openings of Turkey, TIKA established 
cooperation with non-governmental organizations in African states (Gür, et al., 2009, p. 5). 
In 2009, 79.78% of its projects were allocated for the development of social infrastructures 
(Gür, et al., 2010, p. 17). As much as 2008, Afghanistan was still at the top of the list of recipient 
countries for Turkey. However, the rate aids to the Afghans diminished to 20.61% (Gür, et al., 
2009, p. 16). In that year, TIKA enlarged its network and opened three new Program 
Coordination Offices, one in Serbia and its sixth Office in another Balkan country (Gür, et al., 
2010, p. 4). 
In 2010, Afghanistan took first place again with 24.54% of budget allocated for the 
development aids by Turkey (Gür, et al., 2011, p. 9). In that year, TIKA provided aid for 
earthquake victims in Haiti (Gür, et al., 2011, p. 7). TIKA coordinated humanitarian non-
governmental organizations and humanitarian aids for Haiti in 2010. The institution also started 
“the Reaching Clean Potable Water Program” and “Agricultural Development Program” for 
Africa in order to make African states self-sufficient (Gür, et al., 2011, p. 7). According to the 
UN-released data, nearly a million people cannot reach clean potable water in the world. For this 
reason, TIKA started to “Struggle against Poverty of Water Program” to provide solution for the 
general water problem (Gür, et al., 2011, p. 5). 
In 2011, TIKA reserved 82.8% of its budget to the development of social infrastructure 
program. Afghanistan was still at the top of the list of donee countries in 2011 with 29.6% of 
budget share (Yıldız, 2012, p. 24). TIKA renovated many mosques, bridges, caravanserais, 
public baths and madrasahs, which are historical artifacts in the Balkans remaining from the 
Ottoman Empire (Yıldız, 2012, p. 11). Moreover, TIKA conducted humanitarian aid projects in 
Somalia due to the fact that Somalia was devastatingly affected by the East African Drought in 
2011 (Yıldız, 2012, p. 26). 
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In 2012, Africa took first places among the donee countries again (TIKA S. G., 2013, p. 
24). Until 2012, TIKA provided nearly half of its budget to the Caucasus and Central Asia, as 
previously noted. Yet, Africa was at the top of the list still in 2012. The most distinguishing 
feature of the year 2012 was that the budget share for development aids were balanced after 
2012. Thereby, Turkey internalized equal approaches to each and every region after the year 
2012. In 2012, TIKA reserved 30.46% of its budget for Somalia (TIKA S. G., 2013, p. 25). In 
Somalia, 126000 people could access clean potable water thanks to the projects conducted by 
TIKA (TIKA S. G., 2013, p. 11). At the same time, 400000 people also had access to clean 
potable water in 13 different countries of Africa and the Middle East (TIKA S. G., 2013, p. 11). 
TIKA also opened Program Coordination Offices in Yangon, Beirut, Tripoli, Mogadishu, 
Tunisia, Nairobi, Sana’a and Cairo (Gür, et al., 2014). 
In 2013, TIKA reserved 33.7% of its budget to Africa (Gür, et al., 2014, p. 18). Palestine 
was, this time, at the top of the donee countries list with getting 20.20% the budget (Gür, et al., 
2014, p. 20). Nearly 90% of aids to Palestine were provided for the health sector (Gür, et al., 
2014, p. 134). TIKA also developed “the Will Project” for disabled people, who are victims of 
the war in Palestine (Gür, et al., 2014, p. 134). TIKA further built hospitals and schools in 
Palestine. 
In 2014, Palestine was again at the top of the donee countries list with obtaining 16.57% of 
the Turkish budget allocated for development assistance. 2000 people died during the attacks on 
Palestine, and TIKA was the pioneering organization to provide and organize aids for Palestine. 
Thus, nearly 60% of aid to Palestine was provided for the health sector. TIKA also provides aids 
for flood victims of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Pakistan. In 2014, TIKA opened two more Program 
Coordination Offices in Tunisia and Algeria in order to enlarge its network in the African 
continent. 
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9.2 Major Factors Influencing TIKA’s Choice of Locations for 
Development Assistance 
 
 
In light of the information provided above, it can be concluded that TIKA has its own 
methods choosing the location to provide development aids. The first method is the foreign 
policies, as TIKA’s projects and plans demonstrate parallelism with the Turkish Foreign Policy. 
In other words, TIKA followed footsteps of the Turkish foreign policy. An example of this is the 
fact that TIKA started to develop more projects for Africa after the declaration of “the Year of 
Africa” in 2005. After that time, TIKA started to increase the number of its projects as well as 
the share of budgets allocated for Africa on annual basis.  
 
Figure 17: Yearly Changes in Budgets Allocated by TIKA for Development Assistance 
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Figure 18: Yearly Changes in Budgets Allocated by TIKA for Development Assistance 
*Data based on the budget shares on annual basis 
**Data based on percentages 
***Middle East was zero percent in 2007 and 2009, because the Middle East and Africa 
were counted to yield similar data in those years. 
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The second method is that Program Coordination Offices of TIKA provide an opportunity 
to act rapidly in emergency situations. Thanks to the Program Coordination Offices, TIKA can 
obtain information from fields, when there is an emergency such as natural disasters or violent 
conflicts. A third method is that the Program Coordination Offices provide coordination with 
local governments and NGOs for TIKA. As a result of such cooperation, TIKA can get 
information about requirements and needs of states and local people. Fourthly, TIKA’s projects 
also demonstrate parallelism with the international institutions. To give an example, TIKA has 
provided huge amounts of aids to Afghanistan with the “Reconstruction Program of 
Afghanistan”. What is more, TIKA followed the UN reports like “Water Poverty” and developed 
clean potable water projects for people in need. Fifthly, TIKA mainly targets the states that do 
not have enough social infrastructures for their citizens. So, TIKA generally chooses the least-
developed countries for providing development aids so as to meet their minimum requirements 
with regard to life conditions. Finally, TIKA’s aim is not to draw benefits for Turkey from the 
donee countries. Due to that reason, TIKA does not choose specific locations to provide 
development aids. As state before, many ex-colonial powers choose ex-colonies to provide 
development aids for self-interests. However, TIKA does not act on self-interest by choosing 
specific locations for delivering aids. This approach has resulted in a sense of transparency 
associated with TIKA, which further increased the radius of actions by TIKA in different 
geographies. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
The main contribution of this dissertation would be to comprehend that the constructivist 
approaches as well as the critical geopolitics are used commonly to understand the use of soft 
power by Turkey. Critical geopolitical aspirations have significant importance in that sense, as 
they propose a better explanation as to the reasons and consequences of providing development 
assistances to the relevant recipient countries as a tool of soft power. Within this framework, 
there are unfortunately no articles that benefit from the critical geopolitics and constructivism 
together to explain the concept of providing development assistances as a tool of soft power. To 
put it another way, using critical geopolitics and constructivism as a framework in practicing soft 
power is to be the main contribution of this dissertation to the literature. 
In this dissertation, it can be concluded that TIKA is one of the unique institutions of 
Turkey, providing development aids as an element of soft power. To put it another way, TIKA 
has turned out to be the source of soft power for the Turkish Foreign Policy implementations. 
Therefore, there are hierarchical relations between the soft power, Turkish Foreign Policy and 
TIKA.  
One of the key terms in the international relations, soft power is currently used by states as 
an element of their foreign policies. Thus, soft power underpins in shaping the Turkish Foreign 
Policies and providing development aids by TIKA. In other words, soft power contains either 
Turkish Foreign Policy or TIKA. 
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Figure 19: Relations between Soft Power, Turkish Foreign Policy, Development Aids and 
TIKA 
 
As previously analyzed, Turkey could not change its geopolitical perspective during the 
first and second periods of the history of Turkish Foreign Policy. Although constructivism offers 
multilateral perspective to foreign policies after 1990s, classical realist assumptions remained at 
the center of the Turkish Foreign Policy in the second period (1990-2002) due to the poor 
economic conditions, Sévres Syndrome, threat perception from neighbors, Kurdish Issue26 and 
losing the chance to implement balance of power. Yet, these problems were still on the agenda, 
while Turkey changed its geopolitical perspective and foreign policy after 2002 step by step and 
aimed to follow dynamic geopolitical perspectives and multi-dimensional foreign policy. The 
Turkish Foreign Policy underwent a gradual transformation process. The constructivist 
perspective provides theoretical ground for us to understand the concept of soft power and 
development aids as a means to apply of soft power. In addition to that, the dynamic perspective 
of critical geopolitics is also of use in understanding the relations between soft power and 
development aids. The conceptualization of multilateralism under the roof of constructivism 
                                                          
26
 Ocalan issue was an exception. He was caught on 1999. 
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provides a range of motion for TIKA under the framework of the Turkish Foreign Policy. When 
we compare classical geopolitics and critical geopolitics through TIKA, it is easy to say that the 
range of motion for TIKA is limited in the framework of the classical geopolitics theories. 
Moreover, the classical geopolitical perspective also prevents usage of soft power due to 
attaching great importance to hard power and its static structure. In this case, the multilateralism 
perspective of constructivism and dynamic structure of critical geopolitics provide analyses for a 
thorough comprehension. 
TIKA increased its activities year by year since 2002. It also changed its management 
structure twice in order to be able to adapt to the increasing number of activities in the world. 
Moreover, it also developed parallelism with the Turkish Foreign Policy. Hence, the Turkish 
Foreign Policy instrumentalizes TIKA on the basis of soft power. TIKA expanded its field of 
activity with that instrumentalization and reached 26 Program Coordination Offices in four 
continents. What is more, Turkey achieved and, in fact, exceeded the DAC averages whereby 
such an instrumentalization process. Thus, Turkey became one of the main providers of 
development aids among the OECD countries. 
On the other hand, TIKA has encountered many difficulties since 1992. Firstly, the 
classical geopolitical perspective was dominant when it was established. Secondly, due to the 
economic problems of Turkey until 2002, providing development aid was not a priority for 
Turkey. Thirdly, using soft power was generally taking more time than using hard power (Nye, 
2005, pp. 100-101). Hence, the state should have implemented soft power patiently to yield the 
desired results. Therefore, TIKA could not be an active apparatus for the Turkish Foreign Policy 
until 2002. Moreover, it could not be an element of the Turkish Foreign Policy entitled to 
implement soft power. Despite such challenges, TIKA could expand its operation fields and 
became a major element for the Turkish Foreign Policy to implement soft power. TIKA also 
adapted itself to the new parameters of the Turkish Foreign Policy and world politics. It 
developed and continues to develop projects of delivering development aids to the least 
developed countries in accordance with the global rules of OECD and DAC. Hence, it can be 
easily asserted that TIKA has adapted itself to the new parameters of the Turkish Foreign Policy 
rapidly i.e. the Year of Africa. Further, this institution pursues global parameters and rules of 
OECD and DAC, as well. 
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The classical realist assumptions can be regarded as insufficient in comprehending the 
international relations and world affairs. Constructivism, on the other hand, offers a hyper-
dimensional perspective to comprehend the overall world politics. In addition, it can be 
concluded from the analyses in this dissertation that providing development aids or assistance is 
dynamic process within its body. The static perspective of the classical geopolitics is inadequate 
in explicating the concepts of soft power and development aids. It can also be deduced that 
constructivism suggests a solid ground that allows comprehension of the concept of soft power, 
development aids and transformation of the geopolitical perspective that was adopted by Turkey. 
There are some motivations to provide development assistance to the least developed 
countries. This study brings an insight to such motivations for providing development aids by the 
relevant donor countries. Turkey, for example, has several motivations to provide development 
aids. The primary motivation for Turkey can be evaluated as the humanitarian development 
motivations. TIKA provides assistance to establish solid social infrastructures in the donee 
countries in order to ensure long healthy lives foe citizens. Moreover, TIKA builds schools in 
order to increase the years of schooling. A second motivation for Turkey is the political 
motivation. Turkey provides assistance to donee countries to diversify the range of the Turkish 
Foreign Policy. States need allies in the international system. Hence, Turkey provides 
development assistance to obtain support in the international system.  
The analyses in this dissertation prove that TIKA is an important tool for the 
implementation of soft power by Turkey in the international arena. In line with this argument, it 
is possible to observe that TIKA has become one of the important development agencies in the 
world, even if its history is not as long as its equivalent agencies.  
As a result, TIKA has developed in parallel with the Turkish Foreign Policy. There is an 
organic and direct relationship between TIKA and the Turkish Foreign Policy in that sense. 
TIKA can be regarded as the implementer of theorized Turkish foreign policies. Although 
implementation of soft power and provision of development assistance is rather difficult like a 
rocky road, TIKA has turned out to be one of the most successful development agencies in the 
world.  
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